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FAMILY ROSARY CRUSADE IN ENGLAND

Father Peyton has left us, and we who are immensely the richer for his visit experience a sense of personal loss on his departure. Of the tens of thousands who have seen and heard him many ask: what is the secret of his amazing success in the Family Rosary Crusade? We know that in the last three years he has covered the whole of Alaska and Canada from north to south and from the Pacific to the Atlantic and many of the United States, and that everywhere the crusade has had more than ninety per cent of success in the signing of pledges, and that on a later survey more than seventy per cent of the pledges are seen to be faithfully maintained. All the world has read of this whirlwind campaign in the western hemisphere, but many will have said, "That may be well for America, but it won't work here." The answer is, it *has* worked here during the past five weeks in not the least conservative of English dioceses.

The blessing of being the field of Fr. Peyton's first campaign in Europe we owe to a fortunate accident. A few years ago we established a small Retreat House with a community of Holy Cross Fathers. The Bishop, who had heard of the great Crusade in Canada, but who was completely ignorant of the nature of the work, suggested that it would be a good idea to have Fr. Peyton attached to the staff of the new house so that he might preach the Rosary in this and perhaps other dioceses. This was mentioned to the Provincial, but nothing happened. I know now that nothing like that could happen. Neverless the casually thrown grain bore fruit in season.

Last December a cable arrived from one of Fr. Peyton's associates, announcing his arrival in England and asking for an interview. Fr. Woods landed at Northolt on a Monday night, took the train for Lancaster and was here by five the next morning. That was Chapter day and he came to the cathedral. In a very few minutes of lightning talk he convinced us all that this Crusade was what we had been looking for. During lunch we subdivided the diocese into workable areas. After visiting a local editor with a view to buying newsprint Fr. Woods left by an afternoon train for London and was in Paris on his way to Lourdes the same

night. He departed with dates all noted for the various meetings on the understanding that February 11 should be D-day.

After that we heard nothing for five or six weeks. The Bishop (who did not know that Fr. Woods had gone to a hospital with pneumonia) was prepared to postpone the whole scheme and one day towards the end of January he stood at the telephone cabling a message to that effect. But before the message was completed he heard the postman and a letter was brought in. Yes, of course, it was from Fr. Peyton announcing the immediate departure of the crusaders who would be prepared to begin the preliminary work by February 4. "Isn't Our Blessed Lady just wonderful?" Fr. Woods had tied up all the details so neatly and completely that everything was ready for the start on February 11. I began to understand the success of General Eisenhower.

No praise can be too high for those first arrivals. They worked every possible hour of the day and every day of the week. This office work continued at the same high speed all through the five weeks of the campaign. It is quite essential to the conduct of the operation as a whole. The general plan involves the co-ordination of every modern method of publicity, the press, the cinema, the organization of large rallies, weekly sermons by the diocesan clergy, for whose assistance draft notes are supplied to be used at their own discretion. Fr. Peyton himself never preaches a formal sermon.

The objective of the campaign is to get the greatest possible number of signed pledges of daily lifelong practice of the *Family* Rosary. To that end an army of laymen has to be enlisted and drilled. The first step is taken by the parish priest who selects a nucleus of two leading laymen. These co-opt for every hundred families in the parish, and so progressively a group of male parishioners is built up until there is one pledge-seeker for every five families. For these men a small handbook of instructions is issued so that they may understand the right method of approach and know the answers to all the common objections. Every one of us can see many of those objections immediately, but I have never found the organizers at a loss for a satisfactory answer. A priest wholeheartedly in favor of the work may think that he can improve on this method or short-circuit it, but Fr. Peyton attaches the greatest importance to its meticulous observance. By Passion Sun-

day, March 11, we had in the diocese about seven thousand of these layworkers. Every one of them took the pledge himself before he started on his rounds. As they numbered one for every five families we had twenty per cent of the diocese enlisted before the house-to-house work began. And when it began the women came into their own, for they were called upon to maintain a living Rosary in their parish for the success of those who were pleading Our Lady's cause.

But what was Fr. Peyton doing all this time? He was setting the diocese on fire with love for Our Lady and zeal to spread the Family Rosary. We had six centers in various parts of the diocese. He arrived by air on the morning of Monday, February 12. That afternoon he addressed the combined groups of three (parish priest and two lay leaders) drawn from this area. He made a separate address to the teachers of the district, explaining again to them the meaning of the crusade and insisting on the extreme importance of enlisting the aid of the children. He also showed some of his beautiful films. On the successive days of that week we made similar visits to Preston, Blackpool, Grange, Carlisle and Whitehaven. (We are very proud of our lakes and mountain passes, but they do not show their most inviting aspect in February rain and snow!)

In the meantime the films were being shown all over the diocese, occasionally in large cinemas, oftener in parish halls or in schools. There must be comparatively few Catholics who have not seen them, and very many non-Catholics have. In view of that fact I need not enlarge on the beauty, dignity, and reverence of the acting of the Hollywood stars who have freely given of their best for this purpose.

All that was purely preliminary. A week later we started again and during the next two weeks we held rallies in each of these sections. Each rally lasted for about an hour and a quarter, during which there were short speeches by two laymen and the Bishop and the main address by Fr. Peyton. We began in a large theater in Morecambe which was packed by 3,500 listeners. At Cleator in Cumberland 4,000 people stood in silent rapt attention in the keen open air from 8 to 9:15 p.m.; at Preston on a Sunday afternoon 20,000 people stood in a covered market-place and in the adjoining streets; next night at Carlisle there were 4,000 in another covered

market; on the following Saturday 5,000 stood at dusk in a wind-swept football field at Barrow-in-Furness; and on Passion Sunday afternoon we had a glorious rally of 5,200 people in the comfort of the Opera House and Winter Gardens in Blackpool. The owners of these places invariably gave us the use of their premises either completely free of charge or at a nominal fee. After every one of these rallies Fr. Peyton was literally mobbed by those who had been so deeply stirred by his words.

The full campaign is not yet over. Pledges are being gathered this week as I write. But I know that Fr. Peyton has accomplished his task here. The diocese is on fire for the Family Rosary. One almost feels the influence of the grace of the Holy Ghost "as of a mighty wind coming." Everywhere men and women are talking of the Rosary as the defense of the integrity of the family, the one remaining hope of international peace; and thousands of families have already established the Rosary in their home.

But how explain it? The technical organization, the massive impact of press and films, the enthusiasm of the rallies? They have all been important, but let it not be thought for a moment that there was any trace of traditional "revivalism" in the rallies. Not one ranting note was ever heard from Fr. Peyton, but always the lovely lilt of a gentle Mayo tongue married to an American idiom. I heard his address over twenty times in four weeks. I say "address" for it was substantially the same on every occasion. No man is more intolerant of repetition than I am, but this was not dislike repetition. Moreover there was constant repetition of phrases and words in the very address itself. I should think the speaker broke every technical rule that professors of Sacred Eloquence ever expounded. The style brought back twenty-year-old memories of Gertrude Stein or recalled the more everyday literary experience of the brief responses at the Little Hours (*Christe Fili Dei vivi*, etc.). But every now and again came a soaring period which was complete and beautiful in itself. Even then all was quite artless, unstudied, simple, sincere; and yet well-known and practiced orators listened, delighted and deeply moved. What did they think of it? What did Lacordaire and the French Academicians think as they sat at the feet of the simple catechist of Ars? What is the secret? Fr. Peyton himself publicly attributes all his success to prayer: the Mass first, the prayers of priests, religious and the faithful; the "pledged" sufferings of the sick.

Truly God can use any instrument for His work if that instrument is sufficiently humble and docile. (We preachers must never forget the story of Balaam's ass!) But he does usually fit the instrument to His ends by special endowments. By every test except the final one of holding, convincing and moving an audience, Fr. Peyton is no orator. Then what is his secret? I don't think he knows; nor do I. But might one find a clue in the following lines?

> All that I know Of a certain star
> Is, it can throw (Like the angled spar)
> Now a dart of red, Now a dart of blue:
> Till my friends have said They would fain see, too,
> My star that dartles the red and the blue!
> Then it stops like a bird; Like a flower hangs furled:
> They must solace themselves with the Saturn above it.
> What matter to me if their star is a world?
> Mine has opened its soul to me; therefore I love it.

That may be it, Father Pat; you open your heart to us.

✠ Thomas Edward Flynn
Bishop of Lancaster, England

The Priest as Catechist

The instruction of children becomes a grateful task to the pastor when he reflects that he is casting the seed of faith in virgin and fruitful soil where there are no briars or weeds of doubt to choke it. The child is naturally innocent and artless, open and ingenuous, affectionate and confiding. He accepts without misgiving the truths that are taught him. The pastor has, therefore, an open and solid foundation on which to rear the edifice of faith and piety. He has no rubbish of false doctrines to clear away before he begins to erect the building. He has no obstacles to remove, no sophistries to encounter, no prejudices to overcome. In the words of St. Peter, his pupils "as newborn babes" receive "the rational milk without guile that thereby they may grow unto salvation." They have no more suspicion of any poison of error in the food of knowledge given them than the infant that is nourished at the breasts of its mother.

—Cardinal Gibbons in *The Ambassador of Christ* (Baltimore, 1896), p. 307.

COMMUNISM IS PERSONAL!

During the past fortnight I have been privileged to visit Catholic leaders in Spain and Italy. These words are written in Rome after a magnificent outpouring of the faith manifest during Holy Week, 1951. Privileged as I was to visit twenty-four Churches in Rome on Holy Thursday and to witness the great faith there evidenced, I could not help but ask: where are the Communists? And why do we still have Communists in allegedly Catholic countries?

The answer to this question came to me listening to the Passion as Cardinal Fumasoni-Biondi led the services at the Church of Santa Croce. The answer lies in the story of Judas. As long as men have free will, they may turn toward or away from God.

"Where are the Communists?" I asked an Italian prelate.

"During Holy Week," he answered, "they hide from the face of God."

The Communist Laferte, speaking in Mexico City in July, 1944, gave utterance to these alarming but true words: "It is no use hoping for a Communist victory unless we destroy Christianity. . . . We Communists deny the existence of God. We must creep into every worker's union, in disguise, and destroy belief in God."

In Europe the nature of the titanic world crisis appears more clearly than in America. The issue is God, the Triune God: God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. Under the smoldering ashes of ruins in Spain are still evidences that Communists hated everything connected with God.

"If Communists win Europe," said my guide in one of Rome's ancient churches, "these proofs of early Christian devotion will be destroyed. Ah! but there are still many here who do not see Communism as the disguise of Satan."

And then he told me several stories of apostates from Christianity working for the Communist cause.

"They all hate their homes, their fathers, both here and above."

Those words arouse memories of the sad young Marx who revolted against his father's religion, his home, and his government. In the last trial recorded of a Communist in the United States there is the same pattern of revolt of a person. Communism is not an economic system; it is not a religion; it is not a philosophy;

it is man's personal revolt against divine authority, against the place of God in the world and in the home.

Of course, one may not ignore the attempt to deify Stalin, silly though it may be and perhaps a fatal weakness in the whole Communist program. Witness these words from *Zemlia Russkaya,* a book published by the Young Communist League: "Stalin! . . . Here in the Kremlin his presence touches us in every step. We walk on stones which he may have trod only recently. Let us fall on our knees and kiss these holy footprints."

Yesterday I saw thousands fall on their knees in the piazza in front of Santa Croce as Cardinal Fumasoni blessed them with the relic of the true cross, and the emotions aroused in the Christian heart by that relic, the very nail that pierced Christ, and the inscription, partially preserved, which appeared beneath its cross—these emotions the Communists would pervert toward Stalin.

Communism is personal; it is often also a personal revolt against the home, against authority in the home, against the dignity of fatherhood in particular. Study Communists in America, in Spain, in France, in Italy, anywhere; and you find the way has been prepared for apostasy by *unhappy homes.* The first step in rejection of God may be revolt against parents.

The central idea of Christianity is the Fatherhood of God. Christ, who established man's relationship to God, gave to His brothers the right to use the words, "Our Father." If the term "father" is discredited, made ignominious, if the concept of fatherhood on the human level is degraded, do we not then prepare the way for a breakdown of filial devotion to God?

Communism, in its disdain for the dignity of man while prattling of the proletariat, knows also the strategy of mob psychology. Mrs. Cecil Chesterton, in *Russian Adventure,* alludes to this fact in describing the following scene: "The whole crowd was moved by a fervor that communicated itself like a magnetic thrill. The melancholy faces . . . the unstirred eyes, were lit by an inner flame. As one man they leapt to their feet, breaking into salvos of applause. They were missioners, believing in the Soviet way of salvation, prepared to hunger and thirst . . . to offer their flesh on a cross of nails in the Great Cause."

The "Great Cause," in simplest terms, seems to be to get God out of Stalin's way. The only scent of religion in Communism is pantheistic; everything, so Communists maintain, becoming the

servant of the State; the craving for God, for omnipotence, must be realized in the Totalitarian State, from which all blessings flow.

How many people enrolled as Communists really digest its outlook on the universe? Perhaps very few. We have about as many Communists in the United States as we have people afflicted with infantile paralysis. What progress has been made in treating polio has been due to submitting the patient to microscopic study. Is it not time to submit each Communist to such personal observation and clinical treatment as is given victims of poliomyelitis?

Of course, the social predispositions for Communism may not be ignored—disbelief; creeping socialism; loss of a sense of responsibility to God.

"Many Americans," I was told in Spain, "who talk against Communism are *de facto* Communists. They support the evil work of Communists abroad. They compromise with forces of evil and then prepare for war against those forces."

It is senseless to dispute this charge. There are evil influences in the world which are not directly under Communist control, such as religious indifferentism and certain atheistic groups not yet admitted to the Mother Group of Russia. Anything which works against personal love of God must be seen as an auxiliary to that triumph for which Communists hope.

In Europe I have been frequently asked about the Christopher movement. Communists fear its tactic of making young people "Christ-bearers." The Christopher movement (I say this with all due apologies to Fr. Keller) is turning a Communist strategy toward God. Resting as it does upon the personal loyalty and devotion to Christ, it is an antidote for which Communism has no answer.

If the study of individual Communists reveals personal apostasy toward God, likewise the study of converted Communists shows that conversion to religion has been the chief factor in their changed outlook. In fact, so true is this statement that only where there is evidence of sincere religious conversion may one accept the protestations of ex-Communists that they have changed their way of life.

While the mobilization of physical force to oppose Communist aggression goes on apace, leading Communists in countries beyond the iron curtain are more fearful of moral than of physical force. They do not know yet just how to put God out of business without stirring up a new crusade for God. Moral force, which

rests upon the personal loyalty of God-fearing hearts more than on armed strength, challenges Communist expansion.

How tragic it would be if in this critical hour the United States, the nation proclaiming belief in God as the cornerstone of human rights, should fail at spiritual mobilization! Only hearts consecrated to God can offer strength to voices challenging the godless abroad.

MAURICE S. SHEEHY

Rome, Italy

THE DEATH OF THE GOOD PRIEST

If the thought of having to depart from this world is bitter and painful to its lovers, it is not so to the priest that is faithful to his vocation. The world never took possession of his heart. His sacramental Lord loosened the bonds which so frequently and so inordinately bind the human heart to the world. The effects of the Most Blessed Eucharist upon every soul that places no obstacle in the way are always such that by means of divine love they suppress and extinguish all inordinate love for the world. This Mystery draws the faithful priest closer to God, so that the maxim in the depths of his soul is: "Deus cordis mei et pars mea Deus in aeternum." And of this portion death cannot rob him; it only leads him to the full possession of it. He leaves his friends, but the best and most cherished ones that he had in life were those with whom he associated in the course of the ecclesiastical year, the saints of his breviary and of the Holy Mass. With these death will unite him in bliss forever. Even the separation from his earthly friends, whom he met in the course of his life, and with whom he was linked by the bond of love, does not deprive him of peace of heart, for he loved them in God and for God, and therefore the separation caused by death is only a temporary interruption of their earthly friendship. Even the separation from his most intimate companion, his body, which he must leave at death, does not frighten the soul of the faithful priest. The fond hope fills his breast that a day will come when the body which has crumbled into dust will rise again, and will appear more beautiful and glorious than before, for he daily planted in that body the germ of immortality by the worthy reception of the Most Blessed Eucharist.

—Fr. Rudolph Smetana, C.SS.R., in *Our Annual Retreat* (New York, 1922), p. 384.

"THE PURPOSE OF THE MISSIONS": A REPLY

Since my name has been used by Fr. Patrick O'Connor, S.S.C., in his article on "The Purpose of the Missions" in the April issue of the *Review*, I suppose the task falls to me, not of defending Père Charles, S.J., but of trying to clarify the issue. Fr. O'Connor and I have argued this matter several times in private meetings. He told me that he was disturbed by my presentation of Fr. Charles' ideas even with the limitations which I thought necessary. Fr. O'Connor's article was written some time ago in response to something I had written. Fr. O'Connor at the request of others, not myself, withheld it from publication at the time. We had correspondence on the issue and I notice that one of my observations is found in the present article, where Fr. O'Connor reminds his readers that in his *Dossiers de l'action missionnaire* Fr. Charles was not writing a theological treatise for theologians, but articles for the laity. It should be added that Fr. Charles was using the language, the terms, the reasons of the laity. Some theologians seem to have missed this point; they have tried to read the theologian's precise terminology into the less precise words and ideas of the laity. I have Fr. Charles' theological lectures on this matter given at the Gregorian University in Rome and the terminology is theologically precise.

The greatest flaw which Fr. O'Connor finds is Fr. Charles' rejection of the statement that "missionary activity is (primarily) an act of charity of which the primary aim is to save souls." Fr. Charles is a theologian. We must therefore assume that he had no intention of denying a major doctrine of the faith with regard to the place of charity in Christian life. It must be assumed that he appreciates the primacy of charity in the scheme of perfection, that he would not deny the perfection of charity as the missionary's motivation. We must assume that he would hold that the more a work is inspired and transformed by charity, the more meritorious it is both for the perfection of the individual and for the upbuilding of the Body of Christ. We must likewise assume that he would not deny any dogma when he says that the salvation of souls is not the primary purpose of mission activity. We must take it for granted that Fr. Charles admits the salvific Will, the purpose of Redemption and the fulfilment of these facts through the Church.

We should seek then to put the right interpretation on his words under these legitimate assumptions. I believe that it is on this point that his critics have failed; they do not make these assumptions which Fr. Charles evidently felt it unnecessary to expound. Perhaps he erred in not stating these assumptions and declaring his orthodoxy.

Fr. Charles, as a theologian, could never hold that the essential and more excellent way of love should be considered secondary as *motivation* for missionaries. Charity is just as primary in the life of the missionary as in the lives of all Catholics and Fr. Charles knows that because he has written well on the subject of ascetical theology. The study to which Fr. O'Connor refers actually concludes that "*missionary activity* is not *primarily* and *uniquely* an act of charity towards the neighbor in distress; nor (primarily and uniquely) an act of obedience to the command of Christ: it is all that because it is essentially an act of religion."[1] Without entering into a discussion on the point, it should be remarked that Fr. Charles was talking about *missionary activity*, not missionaries; that is, he was seeking the origin in the Church's life of this work of expansion. Therefore it would be pressing his words too far to say that he denied that from the point of view of the missionary charity might be the primary motivation.

We know that peoples have been inspired to go to the missions for many motives. For instance, some have gone prompted by a desire for martyrdom, but this beautiful motivation could hardly be considered the proper *finis* of the work they were to undertake. Others have gone to the missions inspired by love of Christ, love of the neighbor in distress, pity for the erring, gratitude to God for the blessing of faith and the will to offer it to others, hatred of the devil and his dominion over souls. Therefore a distinction must be made between motivation and purpose, between the source of inspiration and the source of obligation. One should not confuse motivation with the specific *finis* of a work, because they do not necessarily coincide. In other words the primary aim of missionary activity is not to demonstrate one's love of the neighbor in dire distress, though it may be the motive which inspires one to take up a work which has a purpose of its own.

[1] *Dossiers de l'action missionnaire*, 1938 ed., p. 24.

When Fr. Charles wrote that the salvation of souls is not the primary purpose of missionary activity, it would be wrong to assume that the salvation of souls in his estimation is not an objective at all in this work. What Fr. Charles had in mind seems to be what the present Pope emphasized in *Mystici Corporis,* that salvation is in and through the visible Church and that without the Church we are nothing. This appears to be the Catholic answer to an individualistic outlook on salvation which infects so many and easily relegates the Church to a secondary place in the scheme of salvation. Surely Fr. Fenton's articles on the necessity of the visible Church in the plan of Redemption underline this fact. It seems that Fr. Charles is but emphasizing the necessity of the visible Church when he maintains that the primary purpose of missionary activity is the establishment of the visible Church in those places where it does not yet exist as such. He would never deny that the salvation of souls is the ultimate objective of all that the Church does in this world. The present Pope in an address to the members of the Congregation *De propaganda fide* in 1944 spoke as follows: "The great scope of the missions is so to establish the Church in new lands and to give it deep roots that one day it can live and develop without the help of the Work of the Missions. The work of missions is not an end in itself; it tends with ardor to this higher end, but it withdraws when this higher end has been attained."[2] Fr. O'Connor has taken great care to cite Papal documents all the way back to the early seventeenth century to bolster his idea that the salvation of souls is the specific purpose of missionary activity. He says that the proponents of what he calls a new "theory" lean most heavily on a text from the Encyclical *Rerum Ecclesiae* of Pius XI. Any interested reader can consult a study of mission documents during the last forty years prepared by Fr. Francis X. Clark, S.J. I will repeat his conclusions.

(1) It is the teaching of the Holy See (in documents since 1909) that the purpose of missions is to establish the Church; therefore it is not just a theory.

(2) If the purpose of the Missions is to be expressed in a single phrase, "to establish the Church" is perhaps the best.

[2] *AAS,* XXXVI (1944), 207 ff.

(4) There is no real opposition between establishing the Church and saving souls. The Holy See emphasizes both."[3]

It is a pity that such confusion has arisen over this subject. It is fair to say that some of Fr. Charles' popularizations may have given ground for criticism. One is reminded of the exaggerations and popularizations by some of the apostles of the Liturgical Movement or in studies in the theology of the Mystical Body. Nobody thinks of stifling the Liturgical Movement or studies in theology just because some have been guilty of excess in propounding the ideas. In like manner some of Fr. Charles' statements should not prejudice us against the genuine results of his efforts to bring into clearer focus the specific objective of missionary activity.

Fr. Charles maintains that the specific purpose of mission work is the establishment of the visible Church. I think we have been inadequate, until recently, in our application of the theology on the Church. Charles' merit is that he has recalled us to the full theology of the Church in the scheme of Redemption with regard to missionary activity. The visible Church is the means established by Christ for the continuation of His Redemptive work and the application of His merits in the world. He Himself spent His public life in laying the foundation of the visible Church. If salvation of souls had been His sole purpose, it would seem humanly that He could have done much more than He did. One cannot then emphasize too much the primary purpose of the Church in the fulfillment of the redemptive plan. If we say that the visible Church is the necessary means for salvation, I do not see any problem when we say that the specific objective of missionary work is to contribute to the foundation of the visible Church among people who do not yet possess the visible Church. This seems all the more true, when the present Pope tells us that the missionary withdraws when the visible Church is established.

It is not good theological method to be impatient or suspicious of distinctions, because distinctions have clarified doctrine marvelously. Confusion usually results from the failure to make distinctions for the refinement of our knowledge. Nor does distinction necessarily mean division or opposition. There is no opposition between what Fr. Charles puts down as the specific objective of

[3] Cf. "The Purpose of Missions," *Missionary Union of the Clergy Bulletin*, June, 1948.

mission work and the over-all objective of the Church's work in this world. As theologians we weigh distinctions. If they clarify an issue and refine our knowledge, they should be maintained. If they do not, they should be rejected. I believe Fr. Charles' distinction does clarify our knowledge of the purpose of mission work.

It would be arbitrary to say that Fr. Charles makes the salvation of souls secondary; he makes it what it is—ultimate and universal. He does reduce the ultimate and universal to specification for a given work. I do not see how the ultimate and universal suffer from the specification of proximate ends which the ultimate embraces. On the contrary, understanding is increased by such specification and direction is more definite. I am sure that Fr. Charles took it for granted that theologians would give him credit for admitting and assuming the ultimate and universal without which he could not be a Catholic, much less a theologian. He was discussing a specific work of the Church; therefore he sought to clarify the specific objective and proximate purpose of that work. It is for his critics to show that this specific purpose of establishing the visible Church is wrong and contrary to the universal. Actually, both ends are realized in the prosecution of a proximate end. A person will tend to the ultimate more effectively, the clearer his view of and the more attentive his application to the proximate ends which conduce to the ultimate. There is no question of elevating the proximate to an ultimate. Fr. O'Connor practically admits the necessity of specifying the objective on p. 287 of his article when he tells us that "the way to convert pagans is to bring the Church to them." Therefore I feel that Fr. O'Connor exaggerates when he writes on the same page: "the salvation of souls is the *raison d'être* of the Church and the missions. It is a mistake to try to distinguish between them." He seems to have fallen into the mistake of thinking that distinction means opposition.

I disagree with Fr. O'Connor when he states that any objective other than the salvation of souls will not flower "in apostolic vocations and in apostolic generosity." Nobody is asking him to sacrifice the inspiration value of the salvation of souls. Nobody is asking him to scuttle the power of love for Christ and for the unbeliever as motivation for missionaries. Pius XII is asking all to increase their love of the visible Church as the driving power for co-operation in the Church's work of transforming the world. The motive for my inspiration, however, does not necessarily constitute

the specific objective of the work which I undertake. I may embrace the contemplative life in order to make reparation for my sins; it does not follow that the specific objective of contemplative life is reparation for sin. Young people can be inspired to go to the missions for a hundred motives and their generosity can be evoked for the same number of motives. Fr. Charles' effort was to clarify in their minds what specifically they were aiming to do when they got there.

It might be added that the Holy See in speaking of the work of foreign missions makes use of many expressions besides the salvation of souls. This should be remembered lest one get the impression from Fr. O'Connor's citations that the only term used is the salvation of souls. The documents use such expressions as "to extend the Gospel," "to propagate the Gospel," "to bring the light of the Gospel," "imparting the light of evangelical doctrine." Benedict XV wrote: "for no other reason was he [the missionary] sent by God but to preach the Gospel" (*Maximum illud*). They also use "propagation of the Christian Faith," "to carry the treasures of the Faith," "to communicate the Faith to others," "to bring pagans to the faith." The documents speak of "the conversion of infidels," "spreading the Kingdom of Christ throughout the world," "to organize the Church," "to set up and establish Christ's kingdom," "to found the Church."

Obviously in the mind of the Holy See there is no opposition in these expressions. As Fr. Clark, S.J., remarks, "There is no conflict between 'establishing the Church' and 'zeal for the salvation of souls'; each helps the other. They do not constitute a duel but a duet." I still believe that a missionary who understands and prosecutes the specific goal of establishing the visible Church in mission lands will have a clearer view of his task than the missionary who goes out with the general idea of saving souls. I believe the former will not be any less inspired and generous than the latter, especially since the great call of our times is for a mounting love of the Church. After all, to contribute to the upbuilding of the Body of Christ where it does not exist is a wonderfully compelling idea. To extend the visible Kingdom of Christ on earth should be just as inspirational in motivation as contributing to the salvation of souls, if motivation is what concerns Fr. O'Connor.

In conclusion let me say that specification of a proximate ob-

jective does no harm to the value of the ultimate. So the proximate purpose of establishing the visible Church in mission lands does not destroy or minimize the value of the ultimate which embraces the proximate. If such has been the result, it is not the fault of the distinction. I would say that we should use every motive we can to inspire young people to the missionary vocation and we should tell them too what specifically their objective is when we prepare them for the missions.

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LITURGY IN THE PARISH

There is a good deal of discussion at the moment in France over the adaptation necessary in a parish to meet the needs of men. Where, as constituted now, it is no longer able to do its job, some revision is necessary. Aside from this, the central problem confronting any Christian or group of Christians is the lack in our parishes of a formation in Christ through the liturgy. There could, of course, be an exclusive preoccupation with the sanctuary and a neglect to bring the implications of the altar to people's lives. Pius XII has twice condemned this. In his second address to women, he calls it an error—the error of the "pure spiritual." Nevertheless, it is possible to be insufficiently interested in the altar. It is quite useless to talk about the reform of society unless the very heart of effort—Christ and His members sacrificing, the act of Redemption renewed, the Mass—takes once more its central and rightful place in the engendering of the Spirit of Christ and building of members of Christ into His living images. "The first and indispensable source of the spirit of Christ is the active participation of the lay people in the sacred mysteries." Familiar words—but far from being realized. By way of example, let me say that in a worker's world (today the world is a worker's world) the most pressing worker's problem is the restoration of the parish liturgy to something vital, to something effective. . . . Here, then, is a challenge to the ruling function of the Christian: to cooperate with the greater ruling and directing power of the parish priest in restoring the active participation of the lay people.

—Reynold Hillenbrand, "The Work of Man as Ruler," in *Guidance in Catholic Colleges and Universities*, ed. by Roy J. Deferrari (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1949), pp. 75 f.

THE STATE: ITS ELEMENTS

The problems involved in the relations between Church and State are serious and many-sided. It, therefore, behooves each of us to give them the best thought of which he is capable in the hope of ultimately finding some way in which God's children can enjoy the services of the two organizations which He has willed for their care, supernatural and natural, without being torn asunder in their loves, i.e. of Church and of country.

It is submitted that one way of approaching one side of the problem is to try to mark out the areas of agreement and of disagreement between Church and State in the juridical sphere. This involves a comparative study of what is being done by both organizations in the field of law, Canon and Civil. It involves, further, a consideration of international law, since the relations run between two sovereignties.

Such a comparative study reveals a similarity of thought between the writings of American judges, international jurists, and writers on *Jus publicum ecclesiasticum*. In view of this similarity Dr. Murray's tears are a bit surprising.

To judge from the language used by the courts of this country, it would seem that the word "state" has several meanings. The United States Supreme Court has said that it sometimes describes[1] a people or community of individuals united more or less closely in political relations, inhabiting temporarily[2] or permanently[3] the same country. Often the word denotes only the country, or territorial region, inhabited by such a community. Not infrequently it is applied to the government under which the people live. At

[1] Cf. also 2 Ottaviani, *Institutiones iuris publici ecclesiastici*, at 2: "Status autem *describi potest* . . ." (Italics added). American as well as Continental Jurists agree with the old Romans: "*Omnis definitio in jure civili periculosa est, parum est enim ut non subverti possit.*" [D (50.17) 202], and proceed by describing rather than by defining. F. M. Cappello, S.J., however, *Summa iuris publici ecclesiastici*, at 271, offers a "definition," which seems rather to be a description.

[2] The Court was considering the situation in Texas in 1868.

[3] This is the more usual situation contemplated by European Jurists, cf. 2 Ottaviani, at 2; G. Del Vecchio, *Lezioni di filosofia del diritto*, at 279.

other times it represents the combined idea of people, territory, and government.[4]

In the case just cited the Court stated that in the Constitution the term "state" most frequently expresses the combined idea of people, territory, and government. A state, then, in the ordinary sense of the Constitution is a political community of free citizens, occupying a territory of defined boundaries, and organized under a government sanctioned and limited by a written constitution, and established by the consent of the governed.[5]

The Connecticut Court, similarly, has stated that the word "state" has been defined broadly as a body of people occupying a definite territory and politically organized under one government. It is generally used in connection with constitutional law in the United States as meaning the individual states making up the Union in contradistinction to the United States as a nation. The United States, however, the Court pointed out, is a "state" as that word is frequently used in international law.[6] The word includes, in its more enlarged signification, all republics and governments not monarchial[7] and even monarchies, if they fall within

[4] Texas v. White, 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 700, 19 L. Ed. 227 (1868), overruled on other points in Morgan v. U. S., 113 U. S. 476, 496, 5 S. Ct. 588, 28 L. Ed. 1044, 1051. 2 Ottaviani, at 2, seems to adopt this combined idea, saying: "*Unio stabilis familiarum ac individuorum, in determinato territorio sub eadem suprema auctoritate aliisque vinculis colligatorum. . . .*" His mention of families as well as individuals, where the United States Supreme Court mentions individuals, as does Cappello, *loc. cit.*, is more accurate historically, because more states have grown out of a union of clans than out of the union of individuals imagined by the Contractualists.

[5] Texas v. White, supra, n. 4. The Texas Court has mentioned that the word "municipality," too, is sufficiently broad in meaning to include a sovereign state, though in its general acceptation the word is not given such a meaning, Welch v. State, 148 S. W. 2d 876, error ref'd (1949).

[6] Thus, The Convention on Rights and Duties of States, signed at Montevideo, Dec. 26, 1933 (U. S. Treaty Series, No. 881) has, in Article I: "The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other States."

[7] The words "republic" and "commonwealth," implying absence of a king, were abandoned only after 1600 when the word "state" came into use in the English language. The word "state" as a verbal expression of the entity which has been variously phrased as the state, the nation, the commonwealth, or the public, was slow in coming into general use in

the reason of its use. It may include the District of Columbia or the United States, if that will carry out the legislative intent expressed in the statute.[8]

The Idaho Court has pointed out that the classical designation clearly to indicate the states as individual governmental entities making up the United Nation, dating from the Constitution and coming down through various acts of Congress and pronouncements of the courts, is the word "states."[9] It is also said that generally the word "state" when used by the court or the Legislature denotes one of the members of the federal Union.[10] While the word "state" may by context be considered to include other governmental organizations than the states of the Union, the converse is not generally true.[11]

The state is conceived as a "body politic,"[12] or political society, organized by common consent[13] for mutual protection and de-

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English. In Queen Elizabeth's time (1558-1603) the word *respublica* in Latin or *commonwealth* in English was more generally used. A statute referred to Guy Fawkes (1570-1606) and others as having attempted "the overthrow of the whole state and commonwealth" (3 Jac. I, c. 3). The Exchequer Chamber, in 1623, spoke of inconveniences introduced "in the republic" by remote limitations, (Palmer's English King's Bench Reports, at 335). The word was still little used by Blackstone (1723-1780), though he does speak of the "danger of the state" (1 Bl. Com. 135).

In the Middle Ages *status* in Latin meant something different. St. Thomas Aquinas, e.g., considers *status* as pertaining, properly speaking, to liberty or slavery in temporal or spiritual things, because it signifies immobility and obligation of the person of a man (*Sum. theol.*, II-II, q. 183, a. 1, and a. 4, and q. 184, a. 4 and q. 186, a. 6). This was its meaning in Roman Law, too, cf. D (40.1-16). This is more like the meaning of the English term "status."

[8] McLaughlin v. Poucher, 127 Conn. 441, 17 A. 2d 767 (1941).

[9] Twin Falls Co. v. Hulbert, 66 Id. 128, 156 P. 2d 319, rev'd 327 U. S. 103, 66 S. Ct. 444, 90 L. Ed. 56 (1945). The Court considered, in this connection, United States Constitution, art. 1, §§2-4, 10; art. 3, §2; art. 4, §4; Amendments 10, 12, 14-19.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] This idea of a "body politic" will be considered more at length in a subsequent article dealing with Corporations and other organizations.

[13] This idea of organization of the state by common consent, which has some elements of the Contractual Theory, will be considered in a later section dealing with the origin of the state.

fense, exercising the powers necessary for such purpose. It combines in one word all of its departments, said the Alabama Court.[14]

The New Mexico Court has added to the idea that the state is a body or society of men, united for the purpose of their mutual safety and advantage by the joint efforts of their combined strength. It has pointed out that it is a body politic which of necessity acts through its duly authorized agents and officers.[15]

Snow[16] points out that a state neither loses any of its rights nor is discharged from any of its duties, by a change in the form of its civil government. The body politic is still the same, though it may have a different organ of communication.[17]

This idea of the body politic recurs in an Ohio Municipal Court decision stating that a "body politic" is a social compact by which the whole people covenant with each citizen and each citizen with the whole people that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good.[18]

The term "state," as the United States Supreme Court has pointed out, is also used to express the idea of a people or political community, as distinguished from the government. In this sense it is used in the clause which provides that the United States shall guarantee to every state in the Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion.[19]

The Texas Court, likewise, has pointed out that a distinction obtains between the state of Texas when considered as a sovereign and when considered as a government, since, when it is considered as a government, some of the powers of a sovereign are withheld by the Constitution, and the totality of powers of the legislative,

[14] State v. Inman, 239 Ala. 348, 195 S. 448 (1940).

[15] State v. Field, 131 N. M. 120, 241 P. 1027 (1926).

[16] Cf. Snow, *Cases on International Law*, at 21.

[17] The Court is looking to the people as distinguished from the officials of their government, to the "multitude" as distinguished from the "vicegerent" thereof, to paraphrase the medieval concept, cf. *Sum. theol.*, I-II, q. 90, a. 3. This involves the international law problem of succession of governments as distinguished from that of succession of states.

[18] Dispatch Printing Co. v. Hain, 9 Ohio Supp. 65 (1935). This reflects the Contractual Theory on the origin of the state.

[19] Texas v. White, *supra*, n. 4.

executive, and judicial officers of the state exercised under the Constitution do not amount to sovereignty.[20]

In line with the foregoing distinction between the state and the government thereof is the statement of the New Hampshire Court. Though the General Assembly, it said, was the government of the state in 1781, it was not the state, but was merely the agent of the state, and the state, constituted by a controlling number of its people, was the sovereign.[21]

Since the government is distinct from the state, and is merely the agent thereof, it follows that a change in the form of government of a community does not *ipso facto* abrogate pre-existing law, either written or unwritten, as the Pennsylvania Court has observed.[22] The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has also held that a government may change and the new government may not be recognized,[23] but the state re-

[20] Harris v. O'Connor, 185 S. W. 2d 993 ref. w. m. (1945); but cf. State ex rel. Shell Oil Co. v. Register of State Land Office, 193 La. 883, 192 S. 519 (1940), *infra*, n. 28.

[21] Trustees of Philips Exeter Academy v. Exeter, 90 N. H. 472, 27 A. 2d 569 (1942). This idea of popular sovereignty will be discussed further in connection with "sovereignty" in general.

[22] Pa. Water Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 226 Pa. 624, 75 A. 945; Mellon v. Same, 227 Pa. 7, 75 A. 956 (1910). Cf. also, *supra*, n. 17.

[23] This involves the problem of "recognition" in international law. Some authors, e.g. 1 Oppenheim, *International Law* (4 ed., McNair), at 143 ff., assert that a state is, and becomes, an international person through recognition only and exclusively. Others, e.g. Williams, *Some Thoughts on the Doctrine of Recognition in International Law*, 47 Harv. L. Rev. (1933) 776, assert that recognition is not constitutive, but declaratory. It accepts, but does not create. Still others, e.g. Brierly, *Law of Nations*, at 104-105, hold that the granting of recognition to a new state is a political rather than a legal act. It does not bring into legal existence a state which did not exist before and a state may exist as a state without being recognized. The primary function of recognition, Brierly states, is formally to acknowledge as a fact something which has hitherto been uncertain, namely, the independence of the state recognized, and to declare the recognizing state's readiness to accept the normal consequences of that fact, namely the usual courtesies of international intercourse. In recent years, however, in practice, non-recognition does not always imply that the existence of the unrecognized state is a matter of doubt. States have discovered that the granting or withholding of recognition can be used to further national policy, e.g. with regard to "Red China."

mains and can continue its action already begun in the courts of this country.[24] In the Tinoco Arbitration[25] it was decided that the *de facto* government which intervened could bind the state which continued to exist.

More abstractly, the New Hampshire Court has spoken of the state as a "legal entity." It has asserted that a state is entitled to the fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities belonging to every legal entity.[26] As a legal entity, however, the state, when it comes within the boundaries of another state, does not carry with it any of the attributes of sovereignty. It is subject to the laws of the other state the same as any other proprietor.[27]

A distinction is thus made by the courts between the governmental and the proprietary powers of a state. The Louisiana Court has said that the state has legislative, public, governmental power in the exercise of which it is a sovereignty and governs its people. It also has proprietary, quasi-private power conferred upon it, not for the purpose of governing its people but for the private advantage of the inhabitants of the state itself as a legal personality.[28]

This distinction is also expressed as a distinction between the government as sovereignty and the government as a corporation. The state may contract and sue in courts. It has some corporate as well as governmental qualities. It has, however, the privilege of not being subject to suit without its consent.[29]

[24] Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. State of Russia, CCA 2, 21 F. 2d 396 (1927).

[25] The Tinoco Arbitration, Great Britain-Costa Rica, 1923, 18 A. J. I. L. (1924) 147.

[26] Tirrell v. Johnston, 86 N. H. 530, 171 A. 641, aff'd 293 U. S. 533, 55 S. Ct. 238, 79 L. Ed. 641 (1943).

[27] Fla. State Hosp. for Insane v. Durham Iron Co., 66 Ga. App. 350, 17 S. E. 2d 842, tfd. 192 Ga. 459, 15 S. E. 2d 509, rev'd 194 Ga. 350, 21 S. E. 2d 216, vac'd 68 Ga. App. 6, 21 S. E. 2d 815 (1942).

[28] State ex rel. Shell Oil Co. v. Register of State Land Office, *supra*, n. 20. The Court, here, is not concerned with where ultimate sovereignty resides so much as it is with the distinction between the state as sovereign and the state as proprietor. This distinction was less clearly noted in the Middle Ages when sovereignty was thought of as an appendage of proprietorship, since most tenures, except for a few which were allodial, were under the king.

[29] State v. Inman, *supra*, n. 14.

In practice, as it appears, there are several terms which are used to indicate the state. Thus the Charter of the United Nations[30] uses the terms "people," "nation," "government," "state," in addition to the term "organization" which designates the group of states forming the United Nations. The Charter begins: "We the peoples of the United Nations . . . have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims. Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives . . . have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations."

Chapter II of the Charter, on Membership, provides, in Article 3: "The original Members of the United Nations shall be the states which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, or having previously signed the Declaration by United Nations of January 1, 1942, sign the present Charter and ratify it in accordance with Article 110."

Writers on international law sometimes attempt to make a distinction between these terms. Thus Halleck[31] says that a state is distinguished from a nation or a people, since the former may be composed of different races of men all subject to the same supreme authority . . . the same nation or people may be subject to, or compose, several distinct and separate states. . . . The terms "nation" and "people" are, however, as he notes, frequently used by writers on international law as synonymous terms for "state."

Del Vecchio[32] uses the term "people" to indicate simply the multitude which constitutes a state. "Nation" means, for him, something more, the people as it is held together by additional natural bonds. One of these bonds is psychological, a deep unity of thought and feeling which is almost second nature, which constitutes the "national consciousness," and implies belief in a common destiny, cemented by the memory of past deeds and common vicissitudes. Another is language, which facilitates not only the communication of ideas and sentiments but also social relations in general. The state, finally, is the multitude recognized as an entity in international law.

[30] Cf. U. S. Dept. of State, Publication 2353, Conference Series 74.
[31] Cf. 1 Halleck, *International Law* at 66.
[32] *Op. cit., supra*, n. 3, at 278.

All of this discussion of terminology would, perhaps, in the Thirties, have been brushed off by a so-called "realist" as but the "verbalism" of "conceptualists."[33] Attacking vigorously the "symbols"[34] of the "Jovian Lawyers," and substituting the "institutional"[35] approach he would have tried to deal with "reality," with persons, things, and relations "as they are," expressed in a new series of fact-words packed with "itness," creating thus, in reality, a new "word-magic."[36]

Staying, however, with the terminology of the courts, we can say that the elements of the state are: people, territory, government, and the bonds which hold the people together. The first element of the state is the people, i.e. an organized collectivity of families and of individuals necessary to the very formation of society and its vital conservation.[37] The idea of necessity of a "people" appears also in *Texas v. White*,[38] *McLaughlin v. Poucher*,[39] *State v. Inman*,[40] and *State v. Field*.[41]

By "people" is meant the multitude of persons who compose the state. The state, like any other form of organization, needs first of all a certain number of individuals. Older writers spent considerable time on the discussion of the minimum number of individuals required to form a State. Some even went so far as to set down numerical criteria, e.g. 10,000. Scientifically, all that can be said in this regard is that it is necessary to have a number of individuals sufficiently large to give to the multitude a complete organization and an autonomous life, independent of other powers. A small number of individuals may suffice to form a family or a clan, but the state supposes a greater differentiation, an organic

[33] Cf. Frank, *Law and the Modern Mind*, at 22-31.

[34] Cf. Arnold, *The Symbols of Government*.

[35] Cf. Shepard, *Democracy in Transition* 29 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. (1935) 1: "By institutions we merely mean collective behavior patterns, the way in which a community carries on the innumerable activities of social life." Cf. also Moore, *Rational Basis of Legal Institutions* 23 Col. L. Rev. (1923) 609; Noyes, *The Institution of Property*.

[36] Cf. Goodrich, *Our Black Ink Balance* 7 Am. L. School Rev. (1932) 385, 395.

[37] Cf. 2 Ottaviani, at 2.

[38] Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

[39] Cf. *supra*, n. 8.

[40] Cf. *supra*, n. 14.

[41] Cf. *supra*, n. 15.

distribution of functions, which will assure in a stable and definite fashion the development of human life in all its forms, and guarantee autonomy. The multitude of individuals who constitute a state is variable while the legal entity of the state remains the same through a succession of generations, and despite an increase or diminution of the number of its components.[42]

It is, however, pointed out that when the term "the people" is used in constitutional law or discussions, it is often the case that those only are intended who have a share in the government, through being clothed with the elective franchise. Thus, "the people" elect delegates to a constitutional convention. "The people" choose the officers under the constitution. For these and similar purposes, the electors, though constituting but a small minority of the whole body of the community, nevertheless act for all, and, as being for the time the representatives of sovereignty, they are considered and spoken of as the sovereign people. In all the enumerations and guarantees of rights, however, the whole people are intended, because the rights of all are equal, and are meant to be equally protected.[43]

The Connecticut Court has pointed out that the guaranty by the Bill of Rights, § 2, to the "people" of the right to alter "their" form of government, has no application to aliens.[44] The people, then, is looked upon as a fixed group, distinct from other groups. Members of other groups, so long as they remain such, are not to be considered as members of "the people." In this connection "the people" is used as synonymous with "state," for in another sense various "peoples" can come together to form one "state."[45]

Some of the requirements that a "people" may be considered as a member of the Family of Nations, i.e. as a state, are discussed in *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia*.[46] In that case the United States Supreme Court held that the Indians in question were not a

[42] Cf. Del Vecchio, at 277.

[43] Cf. Cooley, *Constitution*, 2 ed., at 40, 267; Id., *Constitutional Law*, at 278.

[44] State v. Sinchuk, 96 Conn. 605, 115 A. 33, 20 A. L. R. 1515 (1921).

[45] Cf., e.g., Jugoslavia, known at first as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes; and Czechoslovakia, made up of Czechs and Slovaks; and the various "peoples" in the Soviet Union.

[46] Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 9 U. S. (5 Pet.) 178 (1831). This was prior to the acts extending citizenship to Indians.

"foreign" but a "domestic dependent nation," with the result that they could not bring suit in the United States Courts as a foreign nation, though admittedly they had many of the incidents of a true "nation."

The Court, in its opinion, pointed out that the condition of the Indians in relation to the United States was perhaps unlike that of any other two peoples in existence. In general, it said, nations not owing a common allegiance are foreign to each other, but the relation of the Indians to the United States was marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which existed nowhere else.

The Indian Territory was admitted to compose a part of the United States. In all our intercourse with foreign nations, it was so considered. In our commercial regulations, in any attempt at relationships between Indians and foreign nations, they were considered as within the jurisdictional limits of the United States, subject to many of those restraints which were imposed upon citizens of the United States. They acknowledged themselves, in their treaties, to be under the protection of the United States. They admitted that the United States should have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with them, and of managing all their affairs as they thought proper.

Though the Indians were acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and theretofore unquestioned, right to the lands they occupied, until that right should be extinguished by a voluntary cession to the government of the United States, yet it might well be doubted, observed the Court, whether those tribes which resided within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States could, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They were in a state of pupilage; their relation to the United States resembled that of a ward to his guardian.

They looked to the United States government for protection, relied upon its kindness and its power, appealed to it for relief to their wants, and addressed the President as their great father. They and their territory were considered by foreign nations, as well as by the United States, as being so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States, that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political connection with them, would be considered by all as an invasion of United States territory, and an act of hostility.

The habits and usages of the Indians in their relationships with

their white neighbors, said the Court, ought not to be entirely disregarded. At the time the Constitution was framed, the idea of appealing to an American Court of Justice for an assertion of right or a redress of wrong, had perhaps never entered the mind of an Indian or of his tribe. Their appeal was to the tomahawk, or to the government.

Further light on the meaning of the words was thrown by the clause in the eighth section of the third article of the Constitution which empowers Congress to "regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." In this clause they were as clearly contradistinguished by a name appropriate to themselves, from foreign nations, as from the several states composing the Union.

A similar view was expressed by the Tribunal in the United States-Great Britain Arbitration of 1926.[47] In that decision the Tribunal said that whether Indians were to be treated as a "unit" or as "individuals" depended upon the domestic law of the guardian state, consequently they were not subjects of international law. The Tribunal decided that an Indian tribe was not a legal unit of international law. The American Indians, it found, had never been so regarded. From the time of the discovery of America the Indian tribes had been treated as under the exclusive protection of the power which by discovery or conquest or cession held the land which they occupied.

The state, therefore, is composed of people who form a unit, a "body politic." This unit is held together, most obviously, by certain territorial limits within which the people live.[48] Del Vecchio points out that territory is a natural element of the state. By territory he means a surface of inhabitable land in permanent relationship with the population. Without this element a multitude, no matter how numerous, could not constitute a state. It would always have the character of a temporary agglomeration. Thus, nomadic tribes can at most be considered embryonic states, not as true states.[49] This is true because stability of residence is

[47] Great Britain (The Cayuga Indians Claim) v. United States, Nielsen's Report, at 307.

[48] Texas v. White, *supra*, n. 4; McLaughlin v. Poucher, *supra*, n. 8.

[49] Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, *supra*, n. 46; Great Britain (The Cayuga Indians Claim) v. United States, *supra*, n. 47.

an essential condition for the stability of juridical relationships. Furthermore, a state which did not have dominion over a definite territory would lack autarchy, i.e. necessary independence. There would be a dualism, irreconcilable with sovereignty, if the territory were subject to another power.[50]

Snow[51] says that in international law a state is considered sovereign when it is organized for political purposes and permanently occupies a fixed territory. It must have an organized government capable of enforcing law and be free from all external control. A wandering tribe of savages, or nomads, or people united merely for commercial purposes or under control of another state cannot be considered as a sovereign state.

Another element which holds the state together is government, which exercises the supreme power within it. The United States Supreme Court has said that the several states possess the authority of independent states, except as limited by the federal constitution.[52]

The United States District Court in Indiana has said, further, that the states have all the powers of an absolute unrestrained sovereign, except so far as certain powers have been surrendered to the federal government; while the federal government is one of enumerated, specially defined powers and powers essential to those specifically granted.[53] The United States District Court in Pennsylvania has said simply that the state of Pennsylvania is a sovereign possessed of all the powers of sovereignty.[54]

In the middle of the last century the California Court asserted that each state is supreme within its own sphere, as an independent sovereignty.[55] The Colorado Court has said that all sovereign powers not limited by the federal constitution are vested in the

[50] Cf. Del Vecchio, at 279. Ottaviani points out that without a definite territory there would be no juridical determination of the area within which the supreme political authority is wielded, distinctly and independently of another, cf. 2 Ottaviani, at 3.

[51] Cf. Snow, *International Law*, at 19.

[52] Flexner v. Farson, 268 Ill. 435, 109 N. E. 327, Ann. Cas. 1916D 810, judgm. aff'd 248 U. S. 289, 39 S. Ct. 97 (1919).

[53] Am. Coal Mining Co. v. Special Coal and Food Comm. of Ind., 268 F. 563 (1920), app. dism. 258 U. S. 632, 42 S. Ct. 273, 66 L. Ed. 801 (1922).

[54] U. S. v. 458.95 Acres of Land, 22 F. Supp. 1017 (1938).

[55] People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46, 60 Am. Dec. 581 (1854).

states, except in so far as the people of the respective states may have abridged such powers by their respective Constitutions.[56]

The states, then, have sovereignty, but when it is a question of sovereignty as a state in the Family of Nations the states do not have it. It is, in that case, proper to the United States as such. Thus, the Montana Court has explained that the sovereign power of the United States in the Family of Nations is vested exclusively in the United States government. "Sovereignty" in its full sense imports the supreme, absolute, and uncontrolled power by which any independent state is governed. Although the states of the Union are called sovereign and independent states under the Declaration of Independence, they were never, remarked the Court, in their individual capacity strictly so, because they were always, in respect to some of the higher powers of sovereignty, subject to the control of a common authority, and were never separately recognized or known as members of the Family of Nations.[57]

Still, it was said by the United States District Court in New York that prior to the recognition of Soviet Russia by the United States, the state of New York could properly maintain its public policy of not recognizing Russia's nationalization decrees and in so doing could properly proceed upon the premise that a nationalized Russian bank which before the nationalization decree had assets in New York still had such assets for the purpose of the appointment of a receiver.[58]

Further to explain the sort of power which sovereignty embraces, and which the states, therefore, have, the courts have recurred, as did that of Rhode Island, to the idea of the powers of

[56] People v. Tool, 35 Colo. 225, 86 P. 224, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 822, 117 Am. St. Rep. 198 (1905).

[57] State v. Dixon, 66 Mont. 76, 213 P. 227 (1923).

[58] Steingut v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., 58 F. Supp. 623, aff'd 161 F. 2d 571, mod. 60 F. Supp. 103, cert. dism. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y. v. U. S., 332 U. S. 753, 68 S. Ct. 81, 92 L. Ed. 339, U. S. v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., 332 U. S. 753, 68 S. Ct. 89, 92 L. Ed. 340, 332 U. S. 753, 68 S. Ct. 90, 92 L. Ed. 340, and U. S. v. Steingut, 332 U. S. 753, 68 S. Ct. 90, 92 L. Ed. 340, cert. den. Tillman v. Millard, 332 U. S. 807, 68 S. Ct. 106, 92 L. Ed. 382, and Steingut v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., 332 U. S. 807, 68 S. Ct. 106, 92 L. Ed. 385 (1945). The appointment was under the Civil Practice Act, §977b.

Parliament. That Court said that from the grant of its colonial charter to the Revolution, Rhode Island had the powers granted by the charter. From the Revolution to the adoption of the federal Constitution, May 29, 1790, the Legislature had the combined powers of the British Crown and Parliament.[59]

The Missouri Court has said that the governments of the states possess all the powers of the Parliament of England except such as have been delegated to the United States or reserved by the people, in view of the Constitution of 1870, art. 3, §1, providing that the legislative power, subject to the limitations therein contained, should be vested in a Senate and House of Representatives.[60]

Historically and properly speaking the absolute sovereign power in the Kingdom of England is vested in the king in Parliament.[61] The one fundamental dogma of English constitutional law is the absolute sovereignty or despotism of the Parliament.[62] Hence, no English court sits as a court of appeal from Parliament.

Before the time of Henry III (1216-1272) the need of consulting the nation had imposed a vague restraint upon the crown, but the manner and form of consulting it was uncertain. In the following century Parliament had become a body distinct from and even antagonistic to the king and his council. Since the time of Edward III (1327-1377) the history of England shows an almost constant increase in the power of Parliament.

It is, perhaps, natural to explain the sovereign power of the states of this country in terms of the power wielded by the English Parliament which originally had a final control over the American Colonies. It would, however, appear that the legislatures of the states are less powerful than Parliament, since an appeal lies from

[59] Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas Co., R. I. 295, 77 A. 145, Ann. Cas. 1912B 65 (1910).

[60] McGrew v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 230 Mo. 496, 132 S. W. 1076, Id., 258 Mo. 23, 166 S. W. 1033 (1910). The attitudes of the various states may differ. Those on the Eastern seaboard, the original English colonies, naturally felt a greater tie to the English Parliament than those beyond the Alleghanies which were carved out of the wilderness by the early pioneers who were much more dependent upon their own resources.

[61] Cf. Dicey, *British Constitution*, at 141.

[62] *Ibid.*

them to the courts which can declare their enactments unconstitutional.

The Ohio Court of Common Pleas has said that the sovereignty of each state and of the citizens thereof is complete except that part which has been surrendered to the general government in the form of granted powers or circumscribed by constitutional limitations.[63]

The Colorado Court has explained that the sovereignty of a state embraces the power to execute its laws and the right to exercise supreme dominion and authority except as limited by the fundamental law.[64] It is not, however, the policy of the state to place limitations on the power and means of maintaining its own existence, as the Iowa Court has observed.[65] Thus, an attribute of sovereignty, such as the "police power" of the state, is inherent in the existence of a government and is not the subject of a waiver, barter, forfeiture or sale, as the Mississippi Court has pointed out.[66]

The Vermont Court has said that in the field of "police" legislation the power of the state is unqualified and exclusive, so long as its regulations do not invade the sphere of national sovereignty, obstruct or impede the exercise of any authority which the Constitution has confided to the nation, or deprive a citizen of rights guaranteed him thereunder.[67]

As the South Carolina Court has pointed out, an attribute of sovereignty cannot be abrogated, abridged, or surrendered, except in deference to plain, positive legislative declarations to that effect.[68] Similarly, in an Arkansas case, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals has said that every presumption is against an intention to surrender the sovereign power of the state beyond such a surrender of those powers as a contract with the citizen clearly indicates.[69]

Hence, the state may not be restricted in its sovereignty except

[63] State v. McElmurray, 3 Ohio Supp. 383 (1935).

[64] People v. Tool, *supra*, n. 56.

[65] Teget v. Lambach, 226 Iowa 1346, 286 N. W. 522, 123 A. L. R. 392 (1939).

[66] Pace v. State ex rel. Rice, 191 Miss. 780, 4 S. 2d 270 (1941).

[67] Ex parte Guerra, 94 Vt. 1, 110 A. 224, 10 A. L. R. 1560 (1920).

[68] Brooks v. One Motor Bus, 190 S. C. 379, 3 S. E. 2d 42 (1939).

[69] Arkansas State Highway Comm. v. Butler, CCA 8, 105 F. 2d 732 (1939).

by the specific provisions of its statutes.[70] The New Jersey Chancery has pointed out that in the absence of a treaty, a state has full power to legislate relative to ownership of land within its boundaries.[71]

The reason for the foregoing statements about limitations on sovereignty by the fundamental law seems to lie in the theory of popular sovereignty. Thus, the Nebraska Court has said that sovereignty resides with the people.[72] The Washington Court has explained further that ultimate sovereignty, so far as the state is concerned, rests in its people, and so long as the government established by them exists, such sovereignty remains with them, except in so far as they have expressly surrendered it to a higher sovereignty.[73]

The government, then, of a state may, in American constitutional theory, be sanctioned and limited by a written constitution.[74] It is established by the consent of the governed,[75] much as men form any corporation or voluntary association of their own free will. The manner of formation of the states, frequently with little or no assistance from a power nominally sovereign but distant, has perhaps contributed to this idea. The power of Parliament in England grew at the expense of the power of the king. The power of the states in this country grew principally through the cooperation of individuals and families who had no other protection than that which they could get from each other. Their situation was, therefore, more like that of householders who form a volunteer fire department or a group of vigilantes for mutual protection. Having chosen certain members of the group to take charge of that function, since not all can spare the time, the group still tries to exercise control over those in charge, lest they abuse their positions.

The powers of sovereignty of a state may be delegated, the New

[70] Coleman v. Whipple, 191 Miss. 287, 2 S. 2d 566 (1941).

[71] Caparrell v. Goodbody, 132 N. J. Eq. 559, 29 A. 2d 563 (1943). The Court considered the United States Constitution, art. 6, §2.

[72] State ex rel. Quinn v. Marsh, 141 Neb. 436, 3 N. W. 2d 892 (1942).

[73] Love v. King Co., 181 Wash. 462, 44 P. 2d 175 (1935). The Court was construing the Constitution, art. 1, §1.

[74] *Texas v. White, supra*, n. 4; Trustees of Philips Exeter Academy v. Exeter, *supra*, n. 21.

[75] Texas v. White, *supra*, n. 4.

Hampshire Court has pointed out, but not the sovereignty itself.[76] The United States District Court in South Carolina has said that the state cannot, in return for money, vest in the federal government power which the Constitution vests in the state.[77] The Mississippi Court has also pointed out that the state's sovereignty cannot be bargained away or surrendered by the Legislature, and the federal government cannot acquire from a state a power within it, unless by delegation to the government.[78]

The California Court has also pointed out that it is purely a question of local policy with each state what shall be the extent and character of the powers which its various political organizations shall possess.[79]

The power of the state is lodged in the legislature. Thus, the Missouri Court has pointed out that the state government is a representative republic in which all the power to make laws in the name and with the authority of its constituent elements—its citizens *en masse*—is lodged in the temporary legislature, subject only to the restraining clauses of the state and federal Constitutions.[80]

Briggs[81] notes that some writers maintain that the possession of sovereignty is an essential qualification of a state. He observes, however, that many communities not completely sovereign or independent nevertheless possess the capacity of entering into international legal relations. These communities and states may be termed "international persons," but it will be more convenient, he says, to term them all states in the sense of international law.

[76] Trustees of Philips Exeter Academy v. Exeter, *supra*, n. 21. In that same case it was said that the people of a state may limit the exercise of sovereignty by the government through withholding it or through surrender to another government, and by their delegates chosen for the purpose, but not by their delegates chosen only to be the government.

[77] Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood Co., 19 F. Supp. 932, aff'd 91 F. 2d 665, cert. gr. 302 U. S. 675, 58 S. Ct. 120, 82 L. Ed. 521, aff'd 302 U. S. 485, 58 S. Ct. 306, 82 L. Ed. 381 (1937).

[78] Tatum v. Wheeless, 180 Miss. 800, 178 S. 95 (1938). The Court was considering the Mississippi Constitution §§6, 32, and the United States Constitution, Amendment 10.

[79] Platt v. City and County of San Francisco, 158 Cal. 74, 110 P. 304 (1910).

[80] Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wallbrinck, 275 Mo. 339, 205 S. W. 196 (1918).

[81] Cf. Briggs, *The Law of Nations*, at 63.

Whether a particular community possesses sufficient independence and capacity to assume the rights and obligations of international law is a question of fact; e.g. does the community in question exercise the right of legation, the right of making treaties, the rights of making war or peace? is it held internationally responsible for the damage done on its territory to foreigners? or does some other government exercise these rights and obligations for it? A further test of statehood in the international sense is membership in the United Nations, although non-membership in the United Nations does not prove that the non-member is not a state.

Another bond, in addition to territory and the supreme power, which holds a people together as a state is "nationality." It is true that the concept of "nationality" is not to be confused with that of the "state," but the principle of nationality is one of the principal juridical and historical causes which bind a people together into a particular political organization, i.e. into a state.[82] There are states in which members of various nationalities are to be found bound together, but the foundation of every state is some people whose individuality is determined by various ethnic principles. These arise from a common origin, common language, common religion, common traditions and historical vicissitudes, common social institutes and tendencies, related to a particular conformation, structure and geographical aspect of their territory.

These are all bonds which to a greater or less degree bind a people together, but they are not to be exaggerated. Thus, it would be a mistake to exaggerate the bond of a common ethnic origin, as has been done, and insist that all those of a certain blood group[83] must necessarily form one nation, and this in turn one state. As a matter of fact, there has been such a mixture of blood even from remote times as to make impossible such a reliance upon the blood-strain as an all-powerful unifying element.

Nationality, one's character, status, or condition with reference to his rights and duties as a member of some one state or nation rather than another, may be determined from origin, naturalization, domicil, residence, trade, or other circumstances.[84]

[82] Cf. 2 Ottaviani, *op. cit.*, at 5.

[83] Cf. *Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Blutes und der Deutschen Ehre*, Sept. 15, 1935, 1 Reichsgesetzblatt (1935) 1146.

[84] Cf. 1 Halleck, at 403.

Briggs[85] points out that the general rule of international law with respect to nationality is that each state may decide for itself who are its nationals. The traditional practice of states is to confer nationality at birth either by *jus soli* (birth within the territory) or by *jus sanguinis* (descent from its nationals). A combination of the two systems is found in the laws of most countries. The acquisition of nationality subsequent to birth takes place in a number of ways, the most important of which is voluntary naturalization. One can thus change his position, ceasing to be a member of one state and becoming a member of another.

It is interesting, in this consideration of the state and its elements: people, territory, government, and other bonds, to note how the thought of the jurists, whether European or American, whether as writers on Philosophy of Law, International Law, or *Jus publicum ecclesiasticum* or as writers of opinions in cases which have come before them as judges for decision, runs along similar lines. The thought patterns of human minds, here, as elsewhere, are much the same. There may be arguments about points of Philosophy, as will be seen in connection with the discussion on the origin of the state, but when it is a question of determining rights and duties, whether of the citizen or of the government, in a state the jurists' views are quite similar, and the terms remain unshaken by the Realists' jargon about "symbols" and "institutions." It would seem, then, that in discussing problems of Church and State in this regard one should not depart from the established terms and concepts whereby the great majority of the jurists express themselves.

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[85] Cf. Briggs, at 156 ff.

PRAYER BEFORE HEARING CONFESSIONS

When a priest is on his way to the confessional he should never forget to stop at the foot of the altar to offer there a preparatory prayer in profound recollection. Many dispense with this useful prayer or offer it with an air so absent and preoccupied that it is evidently only an act of routine and vain ceremonial on their part.

—Abbé Dubois in *Zeal in the Ministry* (New York, 1882), p. 400.

THE MEANING OF MARY'S COMPASSION

Part III

MARY OUR COREDEMPTRIX BY WAY OF SACRIFICE

In the third place St. Thomas writes, Christ redeemed us by way of sacrifice. St. Paul's Epistle to the Hebrews is an explication of this doctrine;[1] St. Augustine has, for all time, set forth the grandeur of Christ's death as the uniquely perfect sacrifice.[2] St. Thomas' reasoning on the matter is exact, penetrating. Sacrifice is an act of religion (involving, of course, the offering and immolation of the victim) not only in the acknowledgement of God's supreme dominion but, in the present economy of sin and reparation, to placate God. St. Thomas insistently teaches that the placating of God is the proper effect of sacrifice.

Now surely the Passion and death of Christ bears within itself the proper nature of sacrifice—it is the perfect oblation and immolation of the perfect victim unto the honor of God. Moreover it achieves in perfect fashion the end of sacrifice—the effective placating of God, the re-establishment of that love which is friendship between God and man, between God and all men who are joined to the Christ-Victim. Here again it is Christ's headship of men which is involved in His effective redeeming of us through His action as sacrificial. By His all-pleasing sacrifice, we, too, are pleasing to God, restored to God's favor: for Christ and we are one. Our death is redeemed by His sacrificial death. *Justitia et pax osculatae sunt:* through their embrace upon the Cross love flows freely again, from God through Christ to man; and from man, through Christ unto God.

But even from the sacrificial aspect of our Saviour's Redemption of us, Mary is inseparable. The Eternal Father to whom Christ's sacrifice even of Himself was all-pleasing and before whom it was infinitely efficacious, yet never willed that sacrifice apart from Mary's participation in it. He willed it as Christ Himself willed it, only on condition of Mary's consent and co-operation. By divine ordination this, the divine sacrifice through which comes

[1] *Heb.* 8:5; 9:11-26; 10:10-12, etc.
[2] *De Trinitate,* IV, 14 (*MPL,* XLII, 901).

all life to all men was to be, in the order of execution, dependent upon the Holy Virgin.

The truth of Mary's co-operation in the Passion precisely as a sacrifice is very evident. Recent popes particularly have insisted upon it. Thus, for example, Leo XIII,[3] Benedict XV,[4] and Pius X[5] have emphasized Mary's sacrificial work, writing of her "Filium suum apud crucem obtulit" and similar phrases; Benedict XV adding "quantum ad se pertinebat, Filium immolavit."[6] Among the great teachers in the Church, St. Bonaventure, St. Albert the Great, St. Peter Canisius, and Suarez most clearly inculcate this truth, expressly stating that Our Lady truly offered her Divine Son as victim for us, and for our salvation.[7] St. Albert points out that she offered Him not, as we do, under the appearance of bread and wine, but according as He was in His own body. Under that very species "in which she generated Him she spontaneously, by her consent to His Passion, offered Him for all of us.[8]

The speculative reason which necessitates our assent to this truth is, again, utterly simple. The very point of our Redemption, that which is principal and formal in it, is precisely our reconciliation with God. It is under this aspect that that Redemption is called sacrifice. Now, Mary did co-operate in her Son's work, considered as meritorious and satisfactory precisely because it was the work of reconciliation; precisely, therefore, in so far as it was true sacrifice. For Christ sacrificed by meriting and satisfying—His sacrifice is His meritorious and satisfactory work considered as placating God. Mary, then, being most intimately involved in this meriting and satisfying is inescapably involved in the sacrificing. But it is equally true that Christ merited and satisfied by sacrificing: for while any action of His was most truly of infinite value, God eternally willed to accept as the full price of our Redemption only the death of His own well-beloved Son. To this, Mary consented eagerly, unreservedly. From the very moment of the Annunciation she consented to His character as the Victim-

[3] Cf. *Jucunda semper* (Sept. 8, 1894), *ASS*, XXVII (1894-95), 178.

[4] Cf. *Inter sodalicia* (March 22, 1918), *AAS*, X (1918), 182.

[5] Cf. *Ad diem illum* (Feb. 2, 1904), *ASS*, XXXVI (1903-1904), 453.

[6] Cf. *Inter sodalicia*, *loc. cit.* Cf. also Pius XII in *Mystici Corporis* (Jan. 29, 1943), *AAS*, XXXV (1943), 247 f.

[7] Cf. Roschini, *Mariologia*, pp. 374 f.

[8] *Mariale*, q. 51.

Priest by an act never recalled, often repeated, and often intensified. What God had willed, she willed: what God would ask, she would give. So, always, she knew Him for what He was, adhered with her whole mind and heart to Him in His character as Victim as well as Victor.

Here, too, we must see Mary's co-operation in this tragic-glorious sacrifice in its distinctive character; for here, also, Mary's work is of an order altogether unique. In the first place, her sacrificial work is quite different from that of the Saviour. He and He alone is the Victim-Priest: Mary did not sacrifice Him as He sacrificed Himself. For sacrifice, according to St. Augustine, is two-fold: *interior,* whereby we internally will to inhere in God in holy communication with Him; and *exterior,* that visible work which signifies the interior will. Of the two, interior sacrifice is the more essential; yet, the exterior or visible sacrifice is more properly called sacrifice since that word implies a visible element. This exterior sacrifice is most properly the offering and immolating of some desirable victim in the worship of God. Yet always it signifies the interior sacrifice, according to St. Augustine and St. Thomas.

Now the sacrifice of Christ's life, in the fullest sense of that word sacrifice, was the Lord's work, not Mary's. He, not she, was the officiating priest; for He by an act of His will, not of hers, allowed the death-inducing sufferings He underwent to take their toll even in His own case. His was the efficacious act of will, hers the merely concurring act. The priestly act of immolation, the essence of external sacrifice, was properly His alone.

What, then, did Mary contribute by way of sacrifice? She contributed as no other person ever could by a contribution which was two-fold—remote and proximate. Remotely, she prepared the Victim—bearing Him, nourishing and protecting Him. She raised Him up in order that He might be sacrificed upon the Cross. Proximately, too, she co-operated: co-operated, as Benedict XV declared, by immolating Him in so far as it pertained to her to do so. Not, that is, as any sort of efficient cause, actually and physically immolating Him, but as the woman, the Mother who in her broken heart reflected His own act of offering Himself; as the woman, the Mother who so fully consented to His sacrificial will; as the Mother who, again in the words of Benedict XV,

"abdicated, gave up her maternal rights to her Son for the salvation of men."

Mary's Coredemption of us by way of sacrifice, then, is and could be hers alone; for of all human persons she alone had maternal rights to her Son; only she could sacrifice them. St. John and those holy women who were faithful to Christ upon His Cross gave up a friend, a leader, a loved one. Mary did more, incalculably more: she gave her only-begotten Son. As her claim to Him was different in kind from the claim of any of his other friends or followers, so the giving-up of that claim is a sacrifice—internal, to be sure, not external, visible sacrifice—but true sacrifice, and of a kind different from that possible to any other Saint. Even ontologically regarded, then, her work of sacrifice is proper to her, and possible to no others. This, of course, leaves quite unexplored the moral consideration of the unique degree of charity proper to Mary by reason of which her consent to Christ's death was more perfect, and more complete, than the consent of any other witness there on Calvary. Christ's Passion was all-pleasing to the Father both because of the ontological dignity of Him who offered and was offered: but also on account of the ineffable perfection of the charity which motivated that offering. Analogously, Mary's sacrificial co-operation was in its subordinate order all-pleasing, too, both on account of its ontological perfection and its moral grandeur. For Mary is Mother of God: she is also full of grace.

MARY OUR COREDEMPTRIX BY WAY OF "REDEMPTION"

Christ has saved us by way of redemption in the restricted sense of the term—that is, by way of deliverance from the servitude of sin, of the devil, and of death. This is most amply attested in Scripture. St. Thomas again most briefly shows the theological reason for this. Sin involves slavery: the slavery of no longer being true masters of ourselves but rather servants of our own sin, and of him who has mastered us by inducing us to sin. Secondarily, and consequently, it implies that slavery which is the penalty for sin; for only the slave undergoes what is quite contrary to his will.

The Passion of the Saviour clearly gives deliverance from both subjugations. In bearing the deathly penalty for us, Christ freed us, as His members, from that *penalty:* in Him we have paid the price and are freed from its enslaving burden. Similarly, as to

sin itself: that very offense which turned us from God, and toward evil, toward Satan, is removed; like a chain linking us to the forces of hell, it is broken; broken by the breaking of that union of soul and body in Christ. By His atonement the sin and the binding of our wills to hell, implicit in that sin, are atoned for; in that atonement unto God, sin and slavery are dissolved, and we are freed again to walk as children in our Father's house. So we are redeemed truly at a great price paid to the Eternal Father: a price adequate to the effect, because infinite; a price similar to the effect, because death is redeemed by death; a price, justly set for this effect, because decreed, in its totality, by Him who is subsistent justice. God would accept none other as sufficient, for God in His deepest mercy would justify us by justice, save our lives by losing His.

The note of "redemption," therefore, is as it were a recapitulation of the three modes of the Passion already described but a recapitulation of them under the formal aspect as the payment of a price for our liberation. For, as St. Thomas has written:

> Ad emptionem duo requiruntur: scilicet quantitas pretii et deputatio ejus ad aliquid emendum . . . si ergo loquamur de redemptione humani generis quantum ad quantitatem pretii sic quaelibet passio Christi etiam sine morte sufficisset . . . propter infinitam dignitatem personae. Si autem loquamur quantum ad deputationem pretii sic dicendum est quod non sunt deputatae ad redemptionem humani generis a Deo Patre et Christo aliae passiones Christi absque morte.[9]

The Passion, then, in its mode as redemptive is the meritorious, satisfactory and sacrificial Passion and death of the Lord under the precise aspect of its actual deputization and payment as the price of our being freed. Thus this mode of the Passion is unlike the previous three in that it is in a sense somewhat external. It is not the *opus Passionis* itself in which we can distinguish intrinsic modalities of merit, satisfaction, and sacrifice; rather it is the actual rendering of that *opus Passionis* as a purchase price for a determined good, viz. our deliverance.

That Mary, again, is the perfect co-operator in the Passion formally considered as redemptive is quite evidently true. Some excellent theologians long delayed to use of Mary the title "Co-redemptrix": only in our own lifetime have the popes used that

[9] *Quaest. quod.*, II, a. 2.

word of her. But this has been due not to any hesitation in accepting the reality, the truth designated by the word, but due rather to the suspected equivocation in the word itself, an equivocation which the very employment of the word has shown need not be feared any longer. In any case, the teaching that Mary's compassion is in truth Coredemptive, i.e. a co-operation in the payment of the price of our liberation is both ancient and constant in God's Church. It is most clear in St. Ephraem, St. John Damascene, St. Bernard, Peter Blesensis, St. Bonaventure, St. Albert the Great, St. Bernardine of Siena, St. Antoninus; and is at least implicitly taught by many others.[10]

The speculative reason is both inevitable and profound. The Coredemptrix is she who *de jure* can and *de facto* does co-operate in the very act of paying, as the price of our freedom, the price demanded by God, viz. the Passion of the Saviour. Our Lady, and she alone, *de jure* could, and *de facto* did so co-operate in this act. The major premise is evidently true, resting as it does on an analysis of "redemption" as an actual purchasing by payment of a determined good. In any purchasing, the price paid by him who is truly the purchaser must be a good of that purchaser. The price at which we are bought is the great price: the most precious blood, the very life of God's own Son. The Coredemptrix, then, must (1) be *de jure* capable of co-operating in the offering of Christ as the agreed price, and (2) in fact, actually co-operate in so offering Him.

The minor premise requires some discussion as to both its parts. How was Mary *de jure* capable of co-operating in the offering of Christ as the price of our Redemption? How could she offer Him as somehow something of her own to co-offer? "This now is bone of my bones, flesh of my flesh."[11] Christ had taken His human life, formally as the price of our liberation, from Mary. The very life of Christ, His precious blood, His most innocent flesh, was something of Mary. Hence Mary had, with respect to the man Christ, true maternal rights, true rights with regard to His life. Mary *could* therefore co-offer Him as something of herself because she could, in the words of Pope Benedict XV, "abdicate her maternal rights to her Son." The Divine Maternity, then, is the foundation of our Lady's capability to be Coredemptrix.

[10] Cf. Roschini, *op. cit.*, pp. 379 f.
[11] *Gen.* 2:23.

But in what did our Lady's *actual* offering of Christ as the price of our freedom consist? Here we must consider two things: (1) the moment of the Incarnation, and (2) the moment of Christ's Passion.

With respect to the Incarnation it is imperative to realize that not only is Mary in a physical sense the Mother of the Divine Redeemer, but that by a moral action she *consented to the maternity of Him formally as He is Saviour.* His very name and the other facts about Him announced by the Angel fixed that character upon Him; besides, what was revealed to St. Joseph, "He shall save His people from their sins,"[12] could not have been hidden from Mary. Now Mary knew, all too well, at what price the Messias should buy our salvation. Had not Isaias foretold the Saviour "a man of sorrows and acquainted with infirmity . . . surely he hath borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows: and we have thought Him as it were a leper, and as one struck by God and afflicted. But He was wounded for our iniquities, He was bruised for our sins . . . by His bruises we are healed. . . . The Lord hath laid on Him the inquity of us all . . . he hath delivered His soul unto death."[13] It was as the Man of Sorrows, divinely sentenced to death, that Christ was voluntarily conceived by Mary. To this union, a parental union with Him, precisely as the price of our salvation, Mary gave enduring consent when to Gabriel she answered: "Be it done unto me according to Thy word." Consenting to that, she already, in principle, co-operated in actually offering Him for our Redemption; for she consented by an abiding act of her will to all that would be asked of her formally as Mother of the Divine Redeemer. She consented in principle to abdicate her maternal rights over Him, at the very moment she acquired those rights.

Second, in our view of our Lady's actual co-offering of Christ for us, we must look to the moment of Calvary. In the Passion of the Saviour, that Passion which issued in His death, we can distinguish with St. Thomas two elements, as we can in any suffering: the evil inflicted and the suffering or sadness naturally caused by that evil. Now St. Thomas points out that normally a person *suffers* evils inflicted on himself, *commiserates* at the evils inflicted

[12] *Matt.* 1:21.
[13] *Isaias* 53:3-12.

on another; but he adds "if there are some persons so bound to us as to be so, so to say, something of us, for example children or parents, at their evils we do not commiserate, rather we *suffer* as on account of our own injuries."[14] See, then, how truly Mary was one with Christ in offering the redemptive Passion! That Passion, that suffering was the actual paying of the price: Christ paid it by His suffering: but Mary, because of her union with Him, because He was something of her as Her Son, suffered with Him. The others, John and the holy women, commiserated: Christ and Mary *suffered;* and suffering, not commiseration, was the price to be paid. Note especially that the object of Mary's suffering was identical with the object of Christ's suffering, namely, the cruel evils inflicted on Christ. The very reality, then, which caused Christ's Passion — the shedding of His Blood — simultaneously caused Mary's Compassion. And just as those two were allied in this unique conspiracy of suffering, so were they allied in will: in strong, eager will that together, she through Him and He through His own power, might wrest back the children of God from the beasts of hell. In wisdom and in will and in wretchedness they were one; in their union is our life.

Here there is, I think, hardly need to point out the uniqueness of Mary's role in the Passion precisely as it is a "redemption." No other than she could, in the full, proper sense of the term be Coredemptrix: for notice that both her *de jure* ability to co-offer Christ's sufferings, and also her actual offering of Him begun at the Annunciation, and, so to say, externally ratified and consummated by her Compassion, rest upon her consent to the Divine Maternity (which is altogether proper to her) and upon her subsequent natural oneness with Christ which flowed from that consent. Only she could pay the price and co-operate in redeeming us because only she of all created persons had rights with respect to Christ; she had them, fundamentally, as His Mother.

In a most perfect and most profound sense, then, Mary is indeed our Cordemptrix. Indissolubly joined to the Divine Redeemer by God's eternal predestination she is, in the working out of that predestination, one with Him in a manner indescribably holy, and indescribably exalted, one with Him most of all in that

[14] *Sum. theol.*, II-II, q. 30, a. 1, ad 2.

work for the sake of which He came among us, that work which is peculiarly and Divinely His—the work of our Redemption.

Yet, against this doctrine of Mary as our Coredemptrix serious arguments have been advanced. It is impossible here to consider or to attempt to reply to all such objections; nevertheless, the most basic, most frequent and most difficult of such objections ought very briefly to be considered lest its weight seem to cast real doubt on what might otherwise be clear. The objection itself is already familiar to us all in one or another of its various forms, e.g. nothing can be the cause of itself. But since Mary was herself redeemed she is an effect of Redemption; if she were Coredemptrix she would also be a cause of Redemption. Therefore, since Mary was most certainly redeemed she cannot be Coredemptrix.

The answer to this is implicit in what we have already said. Mary is not Coredemptrix of the entire humanity; she did not, even congruously, merit all grace for all men, absolutely. She is Coredemptrix of all, *save herself:* she merited *de congruo* all graces *except what Christ merited for Himself, and the principle of her grace which He alone merited for her.* Since Mary could not possibly merit the principle of grace for herself (and in that principle of her grace consists her own Redemption) she did not will to do so: and consequently did not do so. Her whole co-operation in the redemptive work therefore was formally, explicitly a co-operation in the Redemption *of all others* to be redeemed. Mary never willed the impossible, never willed what God did not will. Notice that merit is the basis of all other aspects of the Redemption. Since, then, Mary knew that she could not redeem herself by way of merit she knew also that she could not redeem herself by any of the subsequent modes intrinsic to the Redemption, and hence willed, and accomplished, her co-operation not in the totality of Christ's redeeming work but only in its formal restricted aspect of its being the Redemption of all others. For there truly are two formally distinct aspects or *rationes* of the Redemption. Under the first, and more important ratio it is the Redemption whereby Mary was *preserved* from all sin; under the second aspect, it is the Redemption whereby all of us are cleansed from our sins, both original and personal.[15] Co-operation in the second by no means necessitates co-operation in the first.

[15] We say that Mary's "redemptio praeservativa" is the more important

But Christ's redemptive act is *one* act, it can be urged: Therefore, it cannot at the same time be the cause redeeming Mary (in an admittedly eminent way) and something to the constitution of which she is herself contributing. Mary cannot be "being redeemed" by the same act—namely Christ's Passion—for the establishment of which she is co-operating.

Granted that in time Christ's Passion is *one* moral act, we can and must distinguish in it priority and posteriority of nature, as we do with respect to the Incarnation. In one instant the Word of God assumed to Himself a whole human nature, body and soul. Yet the human soul of Christ is understood as pre-informing the body in order to render the latter assumable by the Verbum. Similarly here: the one action, Christ's Passion, *produces the two-fold Redemption but according to a certain priority and posteriority not of time but of nature.* As Christ's body was assumable through His Soul so are we men redeemed through the redemption which includes Mary's co-operation: yet as in one instant both Christ's body and soul were hypostatically united to the Word, so by one action were we and Mary redeemed. As Merkelbach states, an action can be one with respect to a perfect and principal cause, divisible according to the diverse actions of subordinate causes and their diverse effects.[16] For it is extraordinary neither in nature nor in supernature that a subordinate cause at one and the same instant be itself in a real sense a true effect of the principal cause, yet also a cause of the ultimate effect of the same principal cause. A pen, *de se* actually unable to communicate human thought, in one instant has given to it the *vis instrumentalis* whereby it actually can communicate thought and in the same instant does in fact so communicate.[17] The action of the principal cause is one: the subordinate cause is, with it, a principle of the final effect, though not of that formal aspect of the principal agent's causality

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aspect because her sanctity thereby earned is greater than that of all who are cleansed from sin, even taken together. In the judgment of God, then, it is more precious, more important, willed by God with a certain priority; and God's will establishes the true ontological value of things.

[16] Cf. B. H. Merkelbach, O.P., *Mariologia* (Paris, 1939), p. 338.

[17] The example is in the order of instrumental causality because of its clarity; the principle holds for whatever subordinate causality one legitimately ascribes to Mary as our Coredemptrix.

whereby it establishes the subordinate cause as actually causing. These two aspects are distinct formalities of the one action of the principal agent, or cause: the second cause is principled by one aspect, a principle by the other.

Hence this fundamental objection is ultimately soluble in the terms of the ancient distinction between priority of nature and of time, a distinction which need only be applied here as between principal and subordinate causes. This with the clear realization that Mary did *not* function as Coredemptrix in her own preservative Redemption solves the alleged difficulty—that difficulty which above all others has been insistently urged against the doctrine of Mary, our Coredemptrix.

Lastly, then, may we not add one word of reverent joy and thanksgiving that in our own day we have been privileged to see the greater clarification of this most moving and most holy doctrine? Throughout the Catholic world theologians, always more conscious of the grandeur and the sweet power of our Lady, are in this day concerned especially to defend, explain, penetrate the deep truths about the holy Virgin—and with none perhaps are they more concerned than with this very question of our Lady as Coredemptrix.

But it is most of all with sentiments of deepest thanks to God for Mary that we must view this problem. To Mary the Church has not hesitated to apply those strong words:

> The Lord hath blessed thee by his power because *by thee he hath brought our enemies to nought*. . . . Blessed are thou, O daughter, by the Lord the most high God, above all women upon the earth. Blessed be the Lord who made heaven and earth . . . because He hath so magnified thy name this day that thy praise shall not depart out of the mouth of men who shall be mindful of the power of the Lord for ever, for that *thou* hast not spared thy life, by reason of the distress and tribulation of thy people, but *hast prevented our ruin in the presence of our God*.[18]

From all eternity God has predestined the salvation of men: their salvation through the Christ of God. But in that same eternal decree of predestination Mary was associated from before the foundation of the world. Christ, but not Christ alone, rather Christ and

[18] *Judith* 13. Cf. *Missa in Compassione Beatae Virginis Mariae.*

Mary, formed in God's changeless predestination *one total principle of our Redemption.* It need not have been so: but through the infinitely wise mercy of God it is so. Surely that God who has so loved her as to exalt her to the reaches of the Divine Maternity, and of everlasting association with the God-Saviour: surely that God asks of us that we shall love and reverence His handiwork, that we shall pay to her whom He has raised up the everlasting tribute of sheer love and eager devotion.

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THANKSGIVING AFTER MASS

How unfortunate it is to see so many priests who, after Mass, say a few short prayers in the sacristy without attention or devotion, and then begin to speak on useless subjects or on worldly business, or perhaps leave the church immediately after Mass and carry Jesus Christ into the street! They should be treated in the manner in which Father John d'Avila once acted toward a priest who left the church immediately after celebrating Mass. He sent two ecclesiastics with lighted torches to accompany him. When asked by the priest why they followed him, they answered: "We accompany the Most Holy Sacrament which you carry in your breast."

—St. Alphonsus in *Dignity and Duties of the Priest* (New York, 1927), p. 226.

IDLE CONVERSATION

Conversation may easily become an excessive indulgence and a sin of indolence. How grave a loss this may be is seen in calculating that one-quarter of an hour wasted daily in chattering amounts to a sum total which is considerable even in a short life. There is no worse talk than too much talk. Talk too little, and you can easily piece it out; talk too much, and you cannot lessen the harm by recalling your words, for they are no longer your own. We dare not imitate the tremendous austerities of the saints; but the avoidance of silly chatter may be our common ground of virtue with them.

—Walter Elliot, C.S.P., in *The Spiritual Life* (New York, 1914), p. 336.

CHRIST THE TEACHER AND THE STABILITY OF CATHOLIC DOGMA

Currently there is considerable interest in promoting the cause of a special liturgical feast of Christ the Teacher. Consequently it will be quite advantageous to study the doctrinal mission of Our Lord, especially as it is exercised in His Church of the New Testament. It is obvious, of course, that, during the course of His public life here on earth, Our Lord's activities within the community of His disciples included the work of teaching, and that His teaching then was definitely teaching in the strictest sense of the term. It is no less obvious that, since the time of His glorious Ascension into heaven, Our Lord, as the Head of the Mystical Body which is His Church, has *enlightened* or *illumined* that society. He has enlightened the Church as a part of that very office by which the Holy Ghost, dwelling within the Church as the Source of its unity and life, has performed a function which has led the Catholic *magisterium* to speak of Him as the Soul of the Catholic Church.

Two questions about this doctrinal activity of Our Lord in His Church are of special interest and importance today. First, is that doctrinal activity in the Church to be classified as teaching in the strict sense of the word, so that Our Lord is properly the Teacher or the *Magister* of the faithful living here and now in His Kingdom on earth? Second, how does this doctrinal activity of Our Lord in His Church serve to explain the inherent stability of Catholic dogma?

The Holy Father's encyclical *Mystici Corporis* contains an excellent summary of the Catholic doctrine on Our Lord's function as the Enlightener of His Church. This teaching is to be found in the portion of the encyclical dealing with Our Lord's work as the *Head* of His Mystical Body. The document explains that, as the Head of the Body, Our Lord possesses a superiority in the line of excellence over all the members, and that He exercises his headship by His government of the Church, through His conformity with His members, by reason of the plenitude of supernatural life existent within Him, and finally by reason of the *influxus* of life which He communicates to the Body and its members. By way of this *influxus,* Our Lord gives enlightenment and sanctification

to the Church and to its members. Here is the pertinent text of the encyclical.

In us the nerves reach from the head to all the parts of the body and give them the power to feel and move; in like manner Our Saviour communicates power to His Church so that the things of God are understood more clearly and desired more eagerly by the faithful. From Him there is poured forth into the body of the Church all the light by which the believers are divinely illumined, and all of the grace by which they become holy as He is holy.

Christ enlightens His entire Church, as is evident from almost innumerable passages of the Sacred Scriptures and of the Holy Fathers. "No man hath seen God at any time: the only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him."[1] Coming as a Teacher from God[2] to give testimony to the truth,[3] He shed such light upon the primitive apostolic Church that the prince of the apostles exclaimed: "Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life."[4] From heaven He assisted the evangelists in such a way that as members of Christ they wrote what they had learned, as it were at the dictation of the Head.[5] And for us who still linger in this earthly exile, He is today the Author of the faith, as, in the fatherland of heaven, He will be the One who brings this faith to its final perfection. It is He who grants the light of the faith to believers. It is He who divinely bestows the supernatural gifts of knowledge, understanding, and wisdom to the pastors and teachers, and above all to His Vicar on earth, so that they may faithfully preserve the treasury of the faith, defend it energetically, and explain and support it in a devout and diligent manner. Finally it is He who, though unseen, presides over and guides the Councils of the Church.[6]

In the first place, the *Mystici Corporis* insists that the entirety of the light by which the faithful are illumined by God within His Church comes to them from Our Lord, the Head of the Mystical Body. As the same document goes on to explain, this "light" includes not only the interior graces required for the production of an act of faith, but the actual statement of the truths of faith them-

[1] Cf. *John* 1:18.
[2] Cf. *John* 3:2.
[3] Cf. *John* 18:37.
[4] Cf. *John* 6:68.
[5] Cf. St. Augustine, *De consensu evang.* I, 35, 54 (*MPL*, XXXIV, 1070).
[6] The passage cited includes the last portion of the paragraph marked "49" and the whole of the paragraph marked "50" in the NCWC translation. The original text is found in *AAS*, XXXV, 215 f.

selves. Our Lord is described as "illumining" the Church insofar as He "has declared (*enarravit*)" the mysteries of the Godhead. Coming as a teacher (*magister*), He enlightened the primitive Church in such a way that the first Vicar of Christ told his Master that he and his companions would not desert Him because He had the words of eternal life. Another aspect of that enlightenment of the Church by Our Lord is to be found in Our Lord's activity in the work of scriptural inspiration. Thus the human nature of Christ is represented as acting as an instrument in the process of inspiration itself.

The *Mystici Corporis* then goes on to describe the doctrinal activity of Our Lord in His Church today. He acts as the *Auctor* of the faith for the faithful here in this world, just as He acts as the *Consummator* of the faith for the souls in heaven. The last section of the citation is an explanation of Our Lord's actual doctrinal work in the Church since the time of His Ascension into heaven, a statement of the manner according to which He works as the *Auctor fidei* within the Church of the faithful.

Here we must note a distinction between the manner of Our Lord's activity in the primitive Church (within the society of His disciples during the course of His public life here on earth) and the way in which He acts with reference to His Church since that period. Both then and now, the *lumen fidei*, the inward supernatural intellectual power by which the creature is rendered capable of accepting the supernatural revealed truths of divine public revelation, must be considered as a gift of God through the sacred humanity of Jesus Christ Our Lord. Christ, as Man, as the Head of the Church has always been the cause of the inward power or grasp of faith in this sense. With respect to the primitive Church and the Church of the time since the Ascension, however, there is a definite difference in another line. Our Lord's teaching function in the primitive Church was that of a direct Instructor. He taught His disciples and the apostles by expressing the divinely revealed truths to them directly in His own words and with His own voice. Since that time He has spoken to the Church through the voice of His ambassadors, men whom He has commissioned to teach with His authority and in His name. We can now briefly consider the function of Christ as the Teacher within the Church with reference to the *lumen fidei* itself throughout the history of the Church.

It is clear that the *habitus* of divine faith and the various actual graces by which man is moved and rendered competent to perform acts of belief in God come to the believer, not only from God but from the sacred humanity of Jesus Christ which acts as an instrument conjoined to the Godhead by the *gratia unionis*. Our Lord as Man is thus the Cause, both by way of efficient causality and by way of His sovereign merit, of the intellectual power or capacity by which each of the faithful is enabled to perform the supernatural cognitive act of theological faith in God. Insofar as this power is produced by the indwelling of the Blessed Trinity, it is attributed or appropriated to the Holy Ghost. The sacred humanity of Jesus Christ Our Lord co-operates in the production of this effect, in such a way that no act of belief is ever performed by any human being independently of Our Lord's humanity, actually working for the effecting of this *lumen fidei* within the intellect of the person He has redeemed.

This, of course, is an effect beyond the power of any merely human teacher. All that the merely human teacher can do in any line, theological or otherwise, is to express the truth which he has grasped and which he wishes to have his pupil come to know, and to adapt that expression in such a way that it will be at once effectively intelligible to the student and an accurate pronouncement of the truth to be conveyed. The mental capacity of the student is something which he can never hope to increase. Yet it is precisely in the way of such an increase in the intellectual capacity of the disciple that Our Lord's primary function as the Enlightener or Teacher within the Mystical Body is exercised.

As far as Our Lord's expression or statement of the divine truths of the Catholic faith is concerned, there is one very special function to which Pius XII refers. As the *Mystici Corporis* reminds us, the divine public revelation which we accept with the assent of theological faith within the Catholic Church is primarily a body of truth which Jesus Christ expressed and set forth effectively to His apostles and disciples during the course of His public life on this earth. Some of that message, furthermore, is contained in the canonical books written by Our Lord's disciples as the instruments inspired by God. Thus the books themselves, and the expression of the truth contained in them, must be attributed to God as the principal cause, and to the sacred humanity

of Jesus Christ as the instrument conjoined to the Godhead. According to the doctrine of the *Mystici Corporis,* then, Our Lord acts as the teacher within His Church in the sense that He is truly the Author of the inspired books containing part of the divinely revealed message with which the *magisterium* of His Church is primarily and essentially concerned.

Even restricting ourselves to the consideration of Our Lord's influence as the Cause or the Author of the inspired books by which the faithful are instructed in the way of eternal and supernatural salvation, His function is something quite different from that of other merely human authors who have labored within God's kingdom in days gone by. St. Thomas Aquinas, to give one highly illustrious example, wrote many books which serve for the instruction of the faithful within the society of Our Lord's disciples. Yet it would be impossible to say that St. Thomas acts now as a teacher, in the strict and proper sense of the term, within the Church. His influence is virtual, emanating from the power which he exercised when he actually taught during his life on earth.

Our Lord, on the other hand, lives now, precisely as Teacher, within His Church. The books of which He is the Author are expounded and explained by men whom He has commissioned, by men who act and teach in virtue of the power which He communicates to them here and now. Thus the work of expressing and of carrying the truth to the disciples within the Church, the function which is pre-eminently the task of the teacher, is something which He is actually performing within the Church at every moment, and which earns for Him, from this point of view, the title of the Church's Teacher or *Magister* in the strict and proper sense of the term.

But, though this be true with reference to the part of divine Christian revelation which is contained in the inspired books, particularly those of the New Testament, we may well ask ourselves about Our Lord's doctrinal function within the Church with reference to the revealed public message as a whole, or even with reference to that portion of it which is not contained in the Sacred Writings. The encyclical *Mystici Corporis* contains adequate instruction on this point also. In this document the Holy Father points to the fact that Our Lord Himself enriches the *ecclesia docens* and particularly the Bishop of Rome with the gifts of wis-

dom, understanding, and knowledge, "so that they may faithfully preserve the treasury of the faith, defend it energetically, and explain and support it in a devout and diligent manner."

Despite the fact that the expression "*divinitus ditat*" is employed in this passage, there is no doubt about the pertinence of this teaching to Our Lord, to the sacred humanity of Christ, the Head of the Mystical Body. As God, or by His divine nature, Our Lord most certainly is the ultimate Source of all the supernatural and natural benefits which come to His creatures. But it is not precisely as God that He is the Head of the Church, and that we are His members. Thus the functions which the Holy Father ascribes to Him in the *Mystici Corporis* are those which He accomplishes in and through His human nature. The granting of the gifts of wisdom, understanding, and knowledge to the members of the *ecclesia docens* is one of these functions. It is obviously something done "in a divine manner (*divinitus*)," since the granting of these spiritual gifts is something of which God alone could be the principal Cause. Here the sacred humanity of Jesus Christ once again acts as an instrument intimately conjoined to the divinity through the *gratia unionis*.

Our Lord's sacred humanity thus performs a real though instrumental work in the granting of these necessary gifts to the leaders of that Church with which He promised to remain until the end of time. The gifts are described, not merely as empowering the *ecclesia docens* to teach and to guard the deposit of Catholic faith infallibly and effectively as long as the Church militant will endure: they are rather depicted as bringing about that actual infallible conservation and teaching. The message which the apostles heard from the lips of Christ, and which they handed over to the Church as divinely revealed doctrine to be preached in the Church militant accurately until the end of time, is taught and guarded infallibly precisely because of the supernatural gifts in the order of cognition which Our Lord in his human nature grants to the *ecclesia docens*.

The three gifts to which the encyclical refers explicitly are all to be found in the list of the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost. Obviously, however, the benefits named in the encyclical are not precisely those listed among the qualities which sacred theology knows as the *dona Spiritus Sancti*. The gifts of the Holy Ghost, as we know

them in theology, are classed in the category of *gratia gratum faciens*. They are thus listed as supernatural gifts which have to do primarily with the spiritual perfection of the individuals who possess them. The benefits to which the encyclical refers are, on the contrary, gifts conferred upon the immediate possessors for the sake of the universal Church of God. Thus, ultimately at least, they are to be classified among the *gratiae gratis datae*. They are given to move the *ecclesia docens* to the accomplishment of the work for which Our Lord Himself commissioned it. Consequently they can only be understood in terms of that commission.

Our Lord gave His apostles, and thus their successors in the *ecclesia docens*, all the authority indicated by His statement that "He that heareth you heareth me: and he that despiseth you despiseth me: and he that despiseth me despiseth him that sent me."[7] In other words, their teaching is presented as Our Lord's own. Acceptance of their teaching constitutes belief in His message, and the rejection of their teaching involves a rejection of Our Lord and of God Himself. The members of the *ecclesia docens* and of course the *ecclesia docens* as a whole must be considered as an instrument of Christ the Teacher.

It is important to realize, however, in just what sense these men must be called the instruments of Jesus Christ. In the first place, it is at once obvious that they are not instruments in the full and complete sense that the inspired human authors of Sacred Scripture were the instruments of God in the production of those books of which God Himself is truly the Author. The end-product of the process of inspiration, in which these men were employed as God's instruments, consisted of books of which God is the Author, and consequently of books which can be ascribed to God in every statement and expression. We can take any one of the statements contained in inspired Scripture, and say that God teaches this definite truth, this definite statement. On the other hand, we do not say that some definite teaching of the *ecclesia docens* is a statement of God Himself. Thus, merely for the sake of example, when the present Holy Father defined the dogma of the Assumption, he did not say that the words of the definition were the actual words of God, as is the case with Holy Scripture. He stated that he made this definition "by the authority of Our Lord Jesus Christ,

[7] Cf. *Luke* 10:16.

of the Blessed Apostles Peter and Paul, and by Our own authority."[8] What was defined was a divinely revealed dogma of the Catholic faith, one of the truths which had been taught to the apostles and handed over to the Church to be taught accurately until the end of time.

In this way the Holy Father (and consequently the entire *ecclesia docens*), has what we may call an ambassadorial instrumentality. The message which the *ecclesia docens* is charged to preach infallibly, the one body of truth with which it is primarily and essentially concerned, is the divine teaching given by Our Lord. With reference to the message itself, they are the instruments of Christ, in such a way that the teaching is attributed to Our Lord as a principal Cause. It is not their doctrine, but His. The effect is not attributed properly to the instrument but rather to the principal cause.

But, as far as the statement or expression of the doctrine is concerned, the members of the *ecclesia docens* act as principal causes rather than merely or exactly as instruments in the employ of Christ. Thus, for example, the doctrine of papal infallibility is Our Lord's own teaching, but we do not say that Christ defined this teaching as a dogma of the Catholic faith. That definition we rightly call the work of the Vatican Council. In exactly the same way, the truth of Our Lady's bodily Assumption into heaven is one of the truths which God Himself incorporated into the body of His Christian and public supernatural revelation. Yet the definition of this dogma is rightly ascribed to Pius XII. He issued that definition by the authority of Christ and by his own authority. His authority came from Our Lord through Peter, but it was and it remains the authority of Pius XII. His is the authority of the Vicar or the Ambassador of Christ. In this way there is justified within the Church the claim of the Apostle Paul that "For Christ, therefore, we are ambassadors, God as it were exhorting by us."[9]

We can return now to the question of those *gratiae gratis datae* through which, according to the *Mystici Corporis*, the ambassadorial function of the *ecclesia docens* is aided by the doctrinal mission of Christ as the Head of His Church. Do the wisdom, under-

[8] This section of the translation of the *Munificentissimus Deus* is to be found in *AER*, CXXIV, 1 (Jan., 1951), 17.

[9] Cf. *II Cor.* 5:20.

standing, and knowledge accorded by Our Lord to the members of His *ecclesia docens*, and particularly to the visible head of His Church, involve the actual possession by these men of the entire deposit of Christian teaching, in such a way that they are always competent to give an authoritative and correct statement of the Christian faith in the face of whatever difficulties or questions that might arise?

Obviously only an affirmative answer may be given to this question, always, however, in the light of the fact that the charism of infallibility is given only to the Holy Father as an individual Bishop, and is given to the rest of the *ecclesia docens*, either gathered together in Council or scattered throughout the world in their various individual local Churches of Christ, only insofar as they are united with the Sovereign Pontiff. In the light of this teaching it becomes clear that the Holy Father, and the rest of the *ecclesia docens* with him, are, through the triumphant power of Jesus Christ, in possession of the truth of divine revelation in such a way that they can always resolve any difficulty or respond to any question about divinely revealed truth by defining what is correct or by condemning what is heretical or erroneous.

This does not mean, of course, that the responses of the Holy Father or of the entire *ecclesia docens* in union with him are always and everywhere instantaneous. The ambassadors of Christ retain their human characteristics in their work for Our Lord in the doctrinal order. And, in the order of human affairs, serious matters are not treated with what might be termed a flippant speed. The teaching function of the *apostolic collegium* is a matter of supreme moment. Consequently it is not only right and proper, but even necessary, that the answers of Our Lord's ambassadors should be, above all, considered responses. Nevertheless, it remains true that the *ecclesia docens* is always competent to take care of the difficulties or questions that may arise on the subject of the message which has been entrusted to it.

A further question suggests itself at this point, a question prompted by the splendid paper read by Fr. Walter Burghardt, S.J., at last June's meeting of The Catholic Theological Society of America in Detroit.[10] The question is this: can the *ecclesia docens*

[10] The paper is to appear in the forthcoming issue of the Society's *Proceedings*.

make new definitions or condemnations without looking towards the monuments of the past? In other words, can the *ecclesia docens*, by looking only into its own consciousness, by examining the content of its own awareness of the revealed message, and consequently without any necessary reference to the past or the monuments of the past, resolve all questions about the Catholic faith? Or, to put the question in still another way, in the most concrete fashion, could the Holy Father have defined the dogma of Our Lady's bodily Assumption into heaven without referring to the teachings and the documents of the past as long as he ascertained the consciousness or the convictions of the *ecclesia docens* on this teaching?

The correct and adequate answer to these questions, or to be more exact, to this question, is far from being a simple matter. It would seem, however, that a realization of the position of the Holy Father and of the other members of the *ecclesia docens* as the ambassadors of Jesus Christ can be quite helpful in arriving at such an answer.

As the Head of His Mystical Body, Our Lord empowers, aids, and actually moves His *ecclesia docens* to the authoritative and accurate statement of His divine message to His disciples within His Church. His ambassadors are commissioned by Him to declare as divinely revealed truth what has been presented as such *semper, ubique*, and *ab omnibus* by the teaching authority of His Church. Since they are ambassadors, and consequently the principal causes of their own statements of God's message, they are bound to act according to the designs of human prudence (or of the gift of counsel) in the correct performance of this work.

Absolutely speaking, once that it has been ascertained that a particular teaching is being proposed here and now as a dogma of the Catholic Church *ubique et ab omnibus*, it is perfectly certain that this has *always* been thus presented in the true and Catholic Church. But, by the same token, once it has been ascertained that the *ecclesia docens* has really declared such a teaching as Catholic dogma in the past, it is perfectly certain that it is being taught as Catholic dogma here and now everywhere and by all the members of the *ecclesia docens*. Yet the tremendous gravity of the matter involved would seem to make it morally impossible to have a definition issued without recourse to an examination of the belief of the Church at the present time and to the monuments of the past

as well. And it would seem that the charismatic gifts granted by Our Lord to the *ecclesia docens* for the right and proper carrying out of its divine commission must include the availability of resources by which the teaching of the past in the Church may be examined in order to see clearly how the doctrine in question has actually been presented by the *magisterium* in times gone by.

The work of teaching in the Councils of the Church is presided over by Our Lord. He it is who guides these assemblies and moves them to the accurate and infallible declaration of Catholic truth. Here, however, as elsewhere, the Council acts as the principal cause, the one to which the effect is proportioned and ascribed, with reference to the statement of the divine truth. The truth itself, of course, remains the teaching of God through Jesus Christ Our Lord.

Once we realize the implications of the truth that Christ teaches in His Church through the men whom He has commissioned as His ambassadors, we are in a position to gain an insight into the full meaning of the stability of Catholic dogma. We are, furthermore, enabled to see the source of some of the confusion which has gone into certain present-day statements about the development of doctrine.

The *ecclesia docens,* acting as the body of Christ's doctrinal ambassadors, is the principal cause of its own statements of doctrine. Thus it must proceed *modo humano,* with tremendous effort, and with the use of all the available pertinent resources. Thus, that *ecclesia docens* has been compelled, over the course of the centuries, to state the body of truth which Our Lord taught in Aramaic to people of Hebrew background to people of every culture and language in history. First it had to express these very truths accurately and effectively to persons who spoke Greek, but whose cultural background was that of the Hebrews. Then it had to bring out this same body of truth, always accurately, to the people and the mentality of Greece, Syria, and Rome.

It is characteristic of the translation of a document from one language into another that this task involves far more than the mere replacement of each individual word by another in the other language. There are terms which can only be translated correctly by phrases in another language. Likewise there are sometimes

rather complicated phrases which can be rendered correctly by a single word in another idiom.

The difficulties are enhanced in the case of the transmission of a spoken message. The accurate expression of one body of truth in two different languages and cultures must take cognizance of the mentalities of the peoples to whom the message itself is addressed. A statement which is perfectly clear to one age or one civilization will necessarily involve the explicit removal of some possible misunderstanding when it is brought accurately to another age or another culture.

Such has been the task of the ambassadors of Christ. Such has been the actual procedure of Christ the teacher within His Church. What might seem at first sight to be an increase in the content of truth proposed as revealed, turns out to be, in the final analysis, the correct statement of the deposit originally confided to the Church. But it is a statement made to a generation that is the heir to all the cultures of the past. And the precisions which have had to be introduced, by the divinely aided labors of the ambassadors of Christ during the course of the centuries, to preclude the possibility of any misunderstanding of the divine message which might be attributable to the *ecclesia docens* itself, have come to us to aid us in our grasp of that message.

Thus that continual restatement of this same truth, this ever-accurate expression of Christ's ambassadors as His agents in His Church, gives us a definite advance in the knowledge of divine revelation since, through the precisions or explanations (or, if you will, the drawing out of implications), it results necessarily in a lessening of the danger that we may misconstrue that teaching to our own spiritual downfall.

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Answers to Questions

WHALE ON FRIDAY

Question: Recently whale steak was put on sale in the public markets of our city. The priests have been asked whether or not it may be eaten on Friday. What should be our reply to this question?

Answer: The whale is a warm-blooded animal, and hence, according to the norm laid down by some thologians would be forbidden as food on a day of abstinence. However, others lay down norms that would allow the use of whale flesh. Thus, Bouscaren says: "The general rule is that animals which live on land and have warm blood are considered meat; others, not" (*Canon Law* [Milwaukee, 1946], p. 630). Since the whale lives in the ocean, it would not be considered forbidden meat, according to this standard, even though it has warm blood. Merkelbach states that by common estimation throughout the whole world mammals are considered lawful abstinence fare if they live at all times in the water, such as whales (*Summa theologiae moralis* [Paris, 1938], II, n. 961). Such authorities would seem to make an affirmative answer to the questioner safely probable.

INDULGENCES FOR NON-CATHOLICS

Question: Can a baptized non-Catholic gain an indulgence—presuming, of course, that he is in the state of grace, and the indulgence is one that does not require confession and Holy Communion?

Answer: One of the conditions for gaining an indulgence is that a person have the intention of gaining it (Can. 925, § 2). Ordinarily a non-Catholic would not have such an intention, at least explicitly. However, it is possible that a non-Catholic might have a sufficient implicit intention in his very profession of a Christian life, as he sincerely understands it (cf. Cappello, *De sacramentis* [Rome, 1938], II, n. 966). The more difficult condition, however, is the need of affiliation with the Catholic Church. The sincere non-Catholic may be related to the Church by implicit de-

sire; but does this give him the capacity of gaining indulgence? It is a matter of dispute among theologians. Fr. Davis says: "It is possible that a baptized Protestant in good faith might obtain the plenary indulgence at the hour of death by fulfilling the necessary conditions" (*Moral and Pastoral Theology* [London, 1945], III, 428). More convincing, however, seems to be the argument for the opposite view, proposed by Fr. F. Hagedorn: "To partake of the benefit of indulgences, one must be in a position to partake of those goods which come from the Church as from a corporate society, one must be within the corporate union of the Church. And being in no such position of vantage, heretics and schismatics are not subjects of indulgence" (*General Legislation on Indulgences* [Washington, D. C., The Catholic University of America Press, 1924], p. 84).

CONFESSION OF THEFT

Question: Has a confessor the right to demand of a penitent who has confessed the sin of theft that he tell how much money was stolen?

Answer: Per se such a penitent satisfies his obligation if he merely informs the confessor whether the amount taken was a grave or light matter. In the supposition that the sum which was stolen sufficed to constitute grave matter, the magnitude of the sum would constitute only an aggravating circumstance. In other words, whether one stole $1,000 or $1,000,000, he could simply confess: "I committed a mortal sin of theft." In practice, however, the confessor is usually justified in asking the amount involved, when one confesses that he was guilty of theft—first, that he may determine whether or not the sin was objectively grave; second, that he may be enabled to direct the penitent in the matter of restitution.

VIATICUM TO A CHILD

Question: May a child in danger of death be given the Viaticum, even though he has not attained the use of reason?

Answer: A categorical answer to this question could be given only if the meaning of the phrase "use of reason" were clearly defined—which is not the case. As this expression is commonly used in the Code of Canon Law it evidently means that degree of intel-

lectual maturity which renders one capable of moral judgments even to the extent of grasping the notion of grave sin (cf. Cappello, *De sacramentis* [Rome, 1938], I, n. 462). The use of reason in this sense is presumed to be attained at the age of seven (Can. 88, § 3). When a child has reached this stage of mental development he is bound by the precept of paschal communion (Can. 859, § 1).

However, when there is question of the administration of the Viaticum the Code requires only that the child have sufficient intellectual development and instruction to be able to distinguish the Body of Christ from common food and to adore It reverently (Can. 854, § 2). Evidently, this is something different from the "use of reason" as defined above. It does, indeed, imply some understanding of what the Holy Eucharist is, but it does not necessarily postulate the ability to understand and to commit grave sin. Indeed, the Code does not demand that the child perceive even those mysteries of faith which must be believed by necessity of means for salvation, and which must be known by the child who receives his first communion outside the danger of death (Can. 854, § 3).

The child of five years, or perhaps even four, who has received proper religious training from his parents might well fulfil the conditions for the reception of the Viaticum. And it should be noted that the Code not only permits but even commands that the Holy Eucharist be administered in such a case (Can. 852, § 2).

It is possible, therefore, that a child may be sufficiently intelligent and instructed to receive the Viaticum, yet could not be given Penance and Extreme Unction, for these sacraments demand the attainment of the use of reason in the sense of sufficient maturity to understand and to commit sin. However, it would seem that in practice, usually when a child is judged capable of receiving the Viaticum, he can be given enough instruction in a short time to dispose him for at least the conditional administration of Penance and Extreme Unction.

FRANCIS J. CONNELL, C.SS.R.

DIVINE OFFICE INDULGENCE AGAIN

Recently we were asked about the indulgence attached to the recitation of the Breviary before the Blessed Sacrament. We answered that on Oct. 23, 1930, the Sacred Penitentiary granted a plenary indulgence to all those in Sacred Orders when they recite

the entire Office before the Blessed Sacrament. Our attention has been called to a fact that was taken for granted; but that there be no misunderstandings we call the notice of our readers to the condition that this indulgence is granted provided that the recipient makes his confession, receives Holy Communion, and prays for the intention of the Holy Father.

EXEQUIAL MASS PROBLEM

Question: At a Solemn Funeral Mass, when precisely does the deacon hold the cope of the celebrant; in the procession to the entrance of the church to meet the corpse and again at the blessing and the incensation of the corpse?

Answer: Fr. Adrian Fortescue informs us as do many other authors on ceremonies that the deacon and subdeacon do not accompany the celebrant to the entrance of the church to meet the corpse and hence there is no problem for the deacon regarding the celebrant's cope. He is instructed, according to the above mentioned authority, to stand at the right of the celebrant and hold the end of the cope as they move around the coffin. That is the only time that the deacon is occupied with holding the celebrant's cope in this ceremony.

PRAYERS AFTER MASS, IN THANKSGIVING

Question: What obligation has a priest to recite the official prayers after Mass in making his thanksgiving?

Answer: Rubricists direct the priest to recite the antiphon, *Trium Puerorum,* and the canticle, *Benedicite,* as he proceeds from the altar to the sacristy. The Code of Canon Law urges us strongly to make a fitting and proper thanksgiving after the celebration of Holy Mass. Fr. O'Connell in his excellent work, *The Celebration of Mass,* implies that there is an obligation *sub levi* to recite these prayers entitled *Gratiarum actio post Missam.* Cappello in treating *De sacramentis* states the following: "Omittere orationes in recessu ab altari dicendas, i.e., Benedicite cum precibus, nullum est peccatum. Ita communius et rectius Doctores." Tanquerey in *De eucharistia* states: "Rubricae extra Missam servandae, id est ante vel post, quales sunt preces in recessu ab altari dicendae communiter ut directivae habentur."

This lenient view is endorsed by a new rubric of the Breviary in the recent edition (1946) by Benziger Brothers. We read: "Cuilibet sacerdoti, qui sequentes preces in Missali Romano pietati sacerdotum propositas ut dicendas, pro eorum opportunitate, post Missae celebrationem recitaverit, i.e., ab antiphona Trium puerorum usque ad Orationem S. Thomae, Gratias tibi ago exclusive, conceditur indulgentia quinque annorum, etc."

We conclude that these prayers in question are only proposed and not imposed, not losing sight, however, of the warning and recommendation urged upon us by the Code of Canon Law and all spiritual writers, who bear in mind always the tremendous privilege of the priest to offer the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass.

COLOR OF VESTMENTS AT THE NUPTIAL MASS

Question: In a Nuptial Mass when the rubrics call for the Mass of the day and a liturgical color other than white, is it allowed to wear white vestments because of the joy of the occasion?

Answer: The questioner no doubt has in mind a Mass at which a commemoration of the votive Mass is made. The occasion does not permit vestments of a color other than those prescribed for the day. One might get around this difficulty by substituting gold vestments on all days except those on which purple or violet vestments are required by the Ordo.

ORDO TO BE FOLLOWED

Question: Recently our auxiliary Bishop ordained some young candidates to the priesthood. The ceremony took place at a parish church staffed by religious order priests who have their own Ordo. For the ordination Mass what Ordo was to be followed?

Answer: The Bishop was required to follow the Ordo of the religious group in charge of the parish and not the diocesan Ordo. He followed diocesan regulations only in so far as there might have been an *oratio imperata* imposed by the Ordinary. The rule is to follow the Ordo of the place where we are offering Holy Mass but to observe our own rite as regards ceremonies.

DISTRIBUTION OF HOLY COMMUNION

Question: Recently one of my curates had his attention called

to the fact that he made a very large cross while distributing Holy Communion. He argued that there were no regulations in this regard. Who is right?

Answer: We are instructed to make a sign of the cross with the consecrated particle before giving Holy Communion to a person. Likewise, we are told to make with each Sacred Host a sign of the cross over and within the limits of the ciborium or paten while saying aloud the words, *Corpus Domini nostri Jesu Christi,* etc. Rubricists are insistent that the cross be within the limits of the ciborium or paten and no larger.

ORGAN PLAYING DURING ELEVATION AND BENEDICTION

Question: What is the regulation about playing the organ during the Elevation of the Mass and the blessing at Solemn Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament? May the organist continue playing at these moments?

Answer: In the *Caeremonial episcoporum* we read that the organ may be played during the Elevation of the Mass, "cum omni melodia et gravitate." Fr. Van der Stappen in his *Sacred Liturgy* quotes a decision of the Congregation of Sacred Rites stating that it is permissible to play the organ softly while the blessing is given with the monstrance.

DOUBLE RING CEREMONY

Question: Again we have the question presented to us concerning the blessing of two rings, one for the bride and one for the groom. Is there any authorization for the priest to recite the same words, "with this ring, etc.," when the bride places the ring on the groom's finger? How about blessing two rings?

Answer: The Roman Ritual provides for only one ring to be blessed. Two rings, one for each party, are quite in accord with the rubrics, as is evident from the following: "Sicubi aliae laudabiles consuetudines et caeremoniae in celebrando Matrimonii Sacramento adhibentur, eas convenit retineri." Certainly no objection can be set forth against the blessing of the second ring along with the ring of the bride. However, the ritual does not make any

provision for a second ring ceremony corresponding to that whereby the groom places the ring on the finger of the bride.

TONE OF VOICE

Question: In saying the words *Corpus Domini nostri*, etc. while distributing Holy Communion should they be recited in a loud voice or almost silently so that only the priest himself can hear?

Answer: Fr. O'Callaghan informs us that this formula in distributing Holy Communion demands not the *vox secreta* but that these words should be said either *voce elata* or *voce mediocri*, even when there is a large number of communicants.

MISSA CANTATA

Question: What are the regulations concerning the parts to be sung at a High Mass? What about music at a Low Mass?

Answer: The entire liturgical text must be sung either to the correct plain song melodies or to other appropriate music, or to a psalm tone or at least a recitative while the organ plays. The liturgy provides for no short cuts such as the celebrant reciting the prayers quietly as in a Low Mass from the Credo to the Preface while the choir renders the entire Credo. At Low Masses celebrated with some solemnity it is not forbidden to sing motets and to play the organ on days when the general rules of the liturgy do not forbid it. Many, however, object to congregational singing and music at Low Masses, maintaining that the real spirit of the Mass is lost.

WALTER J. SCHMITZ, S.S.

MARY'S FAITH

Mary saw her Son in the crib of Bethlehem and believed Him the Creator of the world. She saw Him flee from Herod and yet believed Him the King of kings. She saw Him born and believed Him eternal. She saw Him poor and in need of food, and believed Him the Lord of the universe. She saw Him lying on straw and believed Him omnipotent. She observed that He did not speak and she believed Him infinite wisdom. She heard Him weep and believed Him the joy of Paradise.

—St. Alphonsus Liguori in *The Glories of Mary* (Brooklyn, 1931), p. 565.

Analecta

On April 6, 1951,[1] our Holy Father addressed an allocution to delegates from twenty-two nations, members of the World Movement for Federal Government. He reminded them of the unceasing efforts of the Church in the cause of Peace and assured them that their aim to achieve an effective political organization was in conformity with the Church's traditional doctrine. Indeed, he declared that an organic world government was necessary for the interruption of the current race in the strengthening of armaments. But he warned that a world government could conceivably merely succeed in adding one more legal automatism to the many others that threaten to suffocate the nations and reduce man to an inert instrument in its operations. This would be the case if it followed the pattern already exercising a disintegrating influence in the national-constitutional field, in the economic-social area, and in the cultural and moral sphere. In the first of these three fields he expressed his regret that the pattern shows a disorganization resulting from a blind worship of numerical strength in virtue of which the citizen is regarded as nothing more than a voter, a component unit of a minority or a majority that can be upset by a single vote; under this aspect no attention is given him as a member of a family or a profession. In the second of the three fields noted, our Holy Father criticized the lack of natural and organic unity among those engaged in production and censured the estranging pre-eminence of class division. In the cultural and moral sphere, he warned against the separative effects of a misconceived notion of individual liberty freed from all norms and from all objective and social values, a liberty which is in reality nothing else but moral anarchy, a fact which is particularly apparent when applied to the training of the young.

In an epistle of Jan. 1, 1951,[2] our Holy Father offered his felicitations to His Eminence, Edward Cardinal Mooney, Archbishop of Detroit, on the occasion of the silver jubilee of his elevation to the ranks of the episcopate. In a similar epistle, dated Jan. 28,

[1] *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, XLIII (1951), 278.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 275.

1951,[3] our Holy Father extended felicitations to His Eminence, Michael Cardinal Faulhaber, Archbishop of Munich, on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of his promotion to the episcopate and the thirtieth of his elevation as a Cardinal. Epistles dated Feb. 28, 1951,[4] and March 12, 1951,[5] were sent in commemoration of the second centenary of the death of St. Leonard of Port Maurice to Most Rev. Raphael De Giuli, Bishop of Albenga, and to Most Rev. Benedetto Pesci, Minister of the Roman Province of the Friars Minor. In both epistles our Holy Father praised the saint's success in the conducting of missions and adverted to the fact that for this reason the latter had been made Patron of Parish Missions by Pius XI.[6]

St. Joseph was made the Patron of the Diocese of Barranquilla in Colombia by Apostolic Letters dated Dec. 5, 1949.[7] Apostolic Letters of May 13, 1950,[8] conferred the rank of Minor Basilica on the Church of St. Maternus in the town of Walcourt of the Diocese of Namur.

The Apostolic Constitution establishing the hierarchy in South Africa was dated Jan. 11, 1951.[9] On the previous day,[10] an Apostolic Constitution was issued establishing a college of canons in the Cathedral of Rio Preto, Brazil.

A new Diocese was established in the Philippine Islands by an Apostolic Constitution dated Jan. 27, 1951.[11] The new diocese is the Diocese of Capiz and its territory consists of half of the Diocese of Jaro. A new Apostolic Prefecture was established in Indo-China by an Apostolic Constitution dated Dec. 21, 1950.[12] It is the Apostolic Prefecture of Tha-khek and it comprises territory taken from the Apostolic Vicariate of Laos. A decree of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, dated May 24, 1950,[13] joined to the Apostolic Vicariate of Leopoldville in the Belgian Congo territory taken from the Apostolic Vicariates of Koango, Kisantu, and Coquilhatville.

The Decretal Letter raising St. James de Valois to the honors

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 276.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 311.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 313.
[6] *Op. cit.*, XV (1923), 196.
[7] *Op. cit.*, XLIII (1951), 267.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 268.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 257.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 255.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 264.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 253.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 284.

of the altar are dated May 28, 1950.[14] On April 18, 1951,[15] our Holy Father addressed an allocution to the faithful who had come to Rome to attend on the preceding Sunday the ceremonies of the beatification of Blessed Francesco Antonio Fasani. In the allocution he pointed to the unique distinction enjoyed by the saint in that the latter was a prophet recognized and honored in his own country, in the town of Lucera, where he was born and where he spent himself in the interests of the Church. The decree of the Congregation of Sacred Rites authorizing his beatification is dated March 27, 1951,[16] and the Apostolic Letters of the beatification itself are dated April 15, 1951.[17] The Apostolic Letters of the beatification of the Dominican Martyrs of Tonkin are dated April 29, 1951.[18]

The decree of the Congregation of Sacred Rites accepting the miracles required for the beatification of Blessed Placide Viel is dated March 4, 1951,[19] and the decree authorizing her beatification, March 27, 1951.[20] The decree accepting the miracles for the beatification of Blessed Marie Thérèse Couderc was issued March 4, 1951.[21] On March 27, 1951, the Congregation of Sacred Rites issued decrees accepting the miracles required for the canonization of St. Maria Domenica Mazzarello[22] and St. Emilia de Vialar.[23]

RECENT PONTIFICAL APPOINTMENTS ANNOUNCED IN THE *ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS*

Assistants at the Pontifical Throne:

Sept. 20, 1950: Most Rev. Edmond J. FitzMaurice, D.D., Bishop of Wilmington.

Nov. 7, 1950: Most Rev. Joseph H. Schlarman, D.D., Bishop of Peoria.

Protonotaries Apostolic ad instar participantium:

July 25, 1950: Rt. Rev. Msgrs. James B. Reidy, of the Diocese of Peoria, and Edward A. Gilbert, of the Diocese of Steubenville.

Aug. 19, 1950: Rt. Rev. Msgrs. Edward V. Dargin, Aloysius C. Dineen, Philip J. Furlong, Edward R. Gaffney, Joseph A. McCaffrey, Joseph A. Nelson, John J. O'Donnell, Arthur J. Scanlan, and

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 241.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 280.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 291.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 270.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 305.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 287.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 297.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 289.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 293.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 295.

Francis W. Walsh, of the Archdiocese of New York.

Aug. 28, 1950: Rt. Rev. Msgr. Thaddeus W. Tierney, of the Archdiocese of New York.

Sept. 12, 1950: Rt. Rev. Msgr. Francis L. Phelan, of the Archdiocese of Boston.

Oct. 24, 1950: Rt. Rev. Msgrs. George C. Ehrhardt and John M. Fearns, of the Archdiocese of New York.

Dec. 19, 1950: Rt. Rev. Msgrs. Patrick F. Kennedy, of the Diocese of Salt Lake, and William J. Kubelbeck, of the Diocese of Superior.

Commander with Plaque of the Order of Pius:

June 30, 1950: Bonner Paul Hide, of the Archdiocese of New York.

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FIFTY YEARS AGO

The leading article in *The American Ecclesiastical Review* for September, 1901, contributed by Fr. J. Daley, of Oxford, Mass., is the first instalment of a biography of Msgr. de la Rochefoucauld, one of the heroic French bishops who died for the faith in the Reign of Terror. . . . Writing on "Unexpected Death," Dr. James J. Walsh discusses the medical aspect of diseases of the kidneys and the heart, apoplexy and meningitis, and the probability of death arising from their occurrence. . . . Fr. P. Forde, of Castlerea, Ireland, discusses "The Irish Revival of Today and the Clergy." He urges the Irish clergy to foster both the natural and the supernatural qualities of their people, so that they will appreciate their national heritage. He pleads for a revival of the Irish language, which, he says, "was charged with an intense religious life that could not tolerate a scoffer or a libertine." . . . Under the heading "Money Interest and Papal Infallibility," Fr. J. Campbell argues that "the Popes of seven centuries have approved of moderate interest . . . Councils have condemned exorbitant interest." . . . In the Conference section we read an explanation of the *Sacrosanctae*, which states that this prayer is not so much an indulgence as an act of reparation for the faults committed in the recitation of the Office, though it is called an indulgence in some of the official decisions of the Sacred Congregation of Rites. The prayer itself, the writer asserts, is commonly attributed to St. Bonaventure. . . . Fr. C. Cronin, arguing against Dr. A. MacDonald, defends the view that St. Thomas taught that the sacraments are dispositive instrumental causes of grace.

F. J. C.

Book Reviews

THE ENGLISH CATHOLICS, 1850-1950. Edited by George A. Beck, A.A., Bishop of Brentwood. London: Burns Oates, 1950. Pp. xix + 640. 35s.

This large volume of nineteen essays was published in commemoration of the centenary of the restoration of the hierarchy of England and Wales by Pius IX's apostolic letter, *Universalis Ecclesiae*, of Sept. 29, 1850. The book contains a foreword by Bernard Cardinal Griffin, Archbishop of Westminster, and the work of the fifteen contributors was edited by Bishop Beck of Brentwood who contributes a concluding essay. The centennial of 1950 likewise ocassioned the publication of attractive brochures on the Diocese of Clifton by J. H. Darby and on the Diocese of Nottingham by A. D. Sweeney, as well as a series of articles in the London *Tablet*, among the most notable of which was that of Msgr. Ronald Knox in the issue of Nov. 18, 1950, where he spoke with admirable discernment of the missed opportunities of the Church in the west of England, especially in the days of Bishop Peter A. Baines, O.S.B., who was Vicar Apostolic of the Western District from 1829 to 1843. The most familiar names to American readers among the contributors to the present volume are those of Archbishop David Mathew whose essay on "Old Catholics and Converts" presents a graceful summary of the various social groups among the English Catholics with some interesting generalizations and interpretations. The three essays of Fr. Philip Hughes are, in the judgment of this reviewer, among the best in the book. The thoroughness of the research is particularly apparent in "The English Catholics in 1850" where one is reminded of Fr. Hughes' splendid summary on the eve of the last papal conclave which the *Tablet* of Feb. 18, 1939, carried under the title, "Cardinals and Conclaves. A Study of the Sacred College." Notable, too, are the essay of Professor H. O. Evennett of Trinity College, Cambridge, on "Catholics and the Universities," the two contributions of Professor Denis Gwynn of University College, Cork, on "The Irish Immigration" and "Growth of the Catholic Community," as well as the two essays of W. J. Battersby, F.S.C., on secondary education for boys and girls. Likewise worthy of mention is the original research evident in Fr. Morgan V. Sweeney's "Diocesan Organization and Administration." The volume is supplied with as rich a set of illustrations as this reviewer has seen in any work of this kind and the considerable number of graphs and charts showing population trends, the growth of churches and schools, etc., add to the value of the book. There is a thirteen-page bibliography as well as an index

of ten pages, but the latter leaves much to be desired by way of completeness. Burns Oates have supplied a good grade of paper and clear type and the only fault that could be found with the physical aspects of the volume is the binding which is not firm enough to withstand the ravages of time.

The introductory chapters by Fr. Hughes embody a magnificent outlay of data on the political, social, and economic aspects of the England into which the new hierarchy came in 1850. American Catholic readers will find a striking likeness to the *milieu* in which their own Church operated in the second half of the nineteenth century with the concentration of so large a number of the faithful in the growing industrial towns. In this connection, however, one misses any mention of Georgiana P. McEntee's *The Social Catholic Movement in Great Britain* (New York, 1927) which would have served the author well for certain phases of this discussion. The subject is highlighted by such items as the citation of the remark of Bishop Herbert Vaughan of Salford to the Holy See in 1875 that the poverty of his people was so great that not a single Catholic in his vast population had the means to keep a carriage, and yet in resources Salford ranked next to Liverpool among the sees created in 1850 (p. 63). The poverty of the English Catholics in these years was unmistakable and it was only the very few among the old titled families and new converts who possessed anything like a comfortable income. Both in these introductory chapters and in Fr. Hughes' later essay on "The Bishops of the Century" the reader is afforded some excellent character sketches and judgments concerning the bishops of 1850 and their successors. He singles out William B. Ullathorne, O.S.B., of Birmingham as the most outstanding when he speaks of him as "all in all, surely the greatest of the ninety bishops whose lives make up the first century of the restored hierarchy" (p. 75). While there is no discounting the magnitude of Ullathorne's accomplishments Hughes' is not a judgment in which all his compatriots have concurred. A quarter of a century ago Cuthbert Butler, O.S.B., published a two-volume biography of the great Bishop of Birmingham but in his estimate of Ullathorne and his contemporaries it was Butler's view that among the bishops of that age Wiseman "surpassed them all" (*Life and Times of Bishop Ullathorne, 1806-1889* [London, 1926], II, 229).

As one reads the measured judgments of Fr. Hughes on the English hierarchy of the last century and his delineation of the norms that should be applied by the biographers of bishops (pp. 190 f.) one comes on many a striking vignette that illumines the characters and accomplishments of these prelates. Since 1850 ninety-one bishops have ruled the dioceses of England and Wales and of those only nine have found

biographers. Among the bishops there have been a number of converts, one of whom, William R. Brownlow who governed the Diocese of Clifton from 1894 to 1901, later wrote, "It was history more than anything else that brought me into the Church." It was a remark which prompted Fr. Hughes to add a statement from Newman who had received Brownlow to the effect, "To be deep in history is to cease to be a Protestant" (p. 216). The sensible candor which characterizes Hughes' treatment of the hierarchy is refreshing and gives the reader a deeper appreciation of his integrity as an historian. It is the sort of thing that readers have come to expect from him, and since the volume under review appeared the spirit in which Fr. Hughes writes has won him one of the most striking tributes which this reviewer has ever seen of a work in Catholic history. In a review of his new book, *The Reformation in England* in the *Oxford Magazine* the reviewer filled two columns with almost unstinted praise and closed his analysis with this significant sentence, "If England is ever to be re-won to the papal allegiance, if a parlous Christendom is ever to be inspired to close its ranks it will be by honest writing of this kind" (LXIX [Feb. 1, 1951], 244). Surely no historian of the Church could ask for higher praise of his scholarly efforts than this.

The essay of Fr. Gordon Albion on "The Restoration of the Hierarchy, 1850," is undistinguished and gives no evidence of a use of archival materials. Incidentally, why he should feel it necessary to omit the names of the bishops of the Anglican establishment who daily attacked the restoration of the Catholic hierarchy in the fall of 1850 it is difficult to say (p. 100). Fr. Sweeney's contribution on diocesan organization and administration offers much richer fare. He has gone to the manuscript sources in the archives of the Diocese of Leeds and he reveals no compunction in setting down balanced criticisms on such subjects as Cardinal Manning's mistakes on the question of education in the various plenary councils of the Province of Westminster (pp. 128 f.), and the failure of Catholic Action in England to measure up to expectations (p. 144). But the author is weak on dates and not even the years of the four plenary councils are found in their proper place. The chapter entitled "The Archdiocese of Westminster" by Fr. Gordon Wheeler also proved a disappointment. Neither Fr. Albion nor Fr. Wheeler writes with the grace that one expects from men reared in the English tradition and the entire chapter of the latter is loosely constructed and lacking in accurate references, e.g., giving citations to J. G. Snead-Cox's *Life of Cardinal Vaughan* without the volume number and page. Moreover, there are too many questions raised but left unanswered. How, for example, have the Catholics at Oxford and Cambridge "leavened the English universities" in the twentieth cen-

tury (p. 160)? No one denies the outstanding contribution of Manning to social questions but one would like to have more proof for the statement that "he certainly influenced the compilation and proclamation of the great social Encyclical *Rerum Novarum*" (p. 163). Again there is an annoying vagueness in the statement that the establishment of the British legation at the Vatican in 1915 and the whole course of the relations between England and Rome were partly the work of Cardinal Bourne (p. 176). Fr. Wheeler rightly laments the lack of a scholarly life of Bourne but that deficiency hardly warrants the judgment that it is an indication "that biographical capability in the world of letters has sadly deteriorated" (p. 181). It may be presumed that the "world of letters" is not confined to one side of the Atlantic, and if that presumption is correct he would find a considerable number of competent biographies of outstanding churchmen in recent years, to cite only one, Sister Hildegarde Yeager's *Life of James Roosevelt Bayley* (Washington, 1947).

It was appropriate that a volume of this kind should contain an essay on Cardinal Newman, and that of Fr. Humphrey J. T. Johnson of Cambridge is an interesting contribution. Fr. Johnson candidly admits the current lack of interest on the part of English Catholics in the great Oratorian (p. 263). It is a judgment which in a certain sense confirms the reviewer's experiences in England in the summer of 1950. At that time he made an effort to arouse interest in the transfer of Newman's remains from the obscure spot at Rednal on the outskirts of Birmingham to St. Chad's Cathedral where he might rest alongside Ullathorne. But the suggestion met with a somewhat astonished stare from several to whom he spoke that any American should show that much interest in Newman. Johnson concedes that Newman is far more appreciated in France and Germany where he speaks of "a serious interest" in the cardinal's writings, as well as in the United States where "a more popular Newman movement" is attributed to the paucity of native Catholic authors of repute (p. 264). The pattern of Irish immigration into England as traced by Professor Gwynn, with the predominant numbers settling in the large industrial centers, was very much like that of the United States, but the fewness of Irish bishops which, says Gwynn, gave rise from time to time to comment and resentment could certainly not be said of the Church on this side of the Atlantic (p. 290).

Four of the nineteen essays in the volume are devoted to Catholic education. Of these, that of Professor Evennett is, in the opinion of this reviewer, the most interesting, perhaps because it deals with higher education. The author shows his appreciation of the problems of scholarship among priests and in doing so he makes a statement that

is worth quotation in full since it applies with equal vigor in the United States as it does in England. He said:

> But scholarship, if it is to be fully effective and fruitful, demands the whole of a man's working time. Until we have become accustomed to the notion of scholarship as a priestly work and are prepared to recognize that gifted amateurs with insecurity of tenure in their facilities for regular study cannot build up a first-class tradition or make an adequate mark in the world of learning, we shall never reproduce in England the professional "learned abbé" of the continent or lay the foundations of a Catholic University (p. 314).

A similar view was voiced recently by Thomas T. McAvoy, C.S.C., in his brief article, "The Apostolate of Research" in the *Ave Maria* of Jan. 20, 1951. The problem of a Catholic university for the English Catholics is one which has worried serious minds for over a century. As early as 1834 Nicholas Wiseman envisioned a Catholic university for England as Wilfrid Ward made evident in his *Life and Times of Cardinal Wiseman* (London, 1898), I, 124 f. But the idea has apparently little hope of realization if Professor Evennett is correct in the opinion he advances in the closing paragraphs of his essay (pp. 320 f.). One misses here a "who's who" of the Catholics who have distinguished themselves at Oxford and Cambridge and the other universities since the ban on Catholic attendance was lifted in 1896. But the struggle of Manning to keep the Catholics away and the sensible decision of Vaughan to permit their attendance at the universities is well told. The two chapters of W. J. Battersby, F.S.C., on secondary education are competent summaries of the accomplishments of the religious orders of men and women who have founded and conducted these schools. If the reading at time becomes a bit tedious with its enumeration of foundations and of the different religious congregations it was in all likelihood a difficulty that could not be overcome. No one who has any appreciation for what these valiant religious accomplished would wish to see the name of a single community missing from the list. The most striking feature to this reviewer in Battersby's chapters was the similarity of conditions existing in the realm of secondary education in England and in the United States during the last half of the nineteenth and early years of the twentieth centuries. The coming of foreign religious from Germany and France to staff the schools, the increasing financial burden to keep pace with the publicly supported schools, the need for vocations among the teaching religious, and the obvious lack of consolidation of Catholic educational effort were and are all present on both sides of the water and American Catholic educators will read these chapters with real profit. The same can be said of A. C. F. Beales' essay, "The Struggle for the Schools," where many points of similarity appear and where the very satisfactory and equitable system of financing the Catholic schools of Scotland is explained (pp. 389 f.).

Just as in the United States, the main opposition to Catholic schools in England around 1870 came from the sects and convinced secularists, the resistance today has centered in professional bodies and in many of the leaders of the learned societies (p. 404). Incidentally, the important role played in the school question by the Bishop of Pella will not redound very clearly to his memory, for almost any reader here or in England will ask: who was the Bishop of Pella? Would it not have been much better for Mr. Beales to give the name as William F. Brown, Auxiliary Bishop of Southwark? The same is true for the curious fact that the Vicar Apostolic of the London District tried to persuade the government in 1830 to express its distaste of the Jesuits to the Holy See. It would be more helpful to know that it was Bishop James Bramston who voiced this strange request (p. 443).

Dom Edward Cruise of Downside Abbey writes a fine summary in the "Development of the Religious Orders" which gives proper credit to all the major religious communities who have played so important a role in the life of the English Catholic body and in the perpetuation of the English Catholic literary tradition. The story of Newman having given the text of the *Dream of Gerontius* to Fanny Taylor from out of his wastepaper basket is accepted by Dom Cruise (p. 461) but declared a myth by J. J. Dwyer in his chapter on the Catholic press (p. 497). The Dwyer contribution gives an interesting summary of the principal trends and personalities in the Catholic press from the launching of the *Dublin Review* in May, 1836, to the current situation as it relates to the *Tablet*, the *Universe*, and the *Catholic Herald*. The *Universe's* circulation of 230,000 is not, however, "probably the largest of any religious newspaper in the world" (p. 507). Both the *Sunday Visitor* and the Denver *Register* in the United States have a circulation well beyond a half million. In his survey of English Catholic literature since 1850 Edward Hutton treats the subject under the headings of history, biography, poetry, essays, criticism, *belles lettres*, fiction, and religion. It was a fruitful century for the English Catholics in all these fields and in history the author rightly gives first credit to John Lingard for his monumental *History of England* which was published between 1819 and 1830 and went through six editions by 1854, earning for the author the respect of scholars of all and no religious faith. It is amusing to recall that Lingard's work was denounced by Bishop John Milner, the able but stormy Vicar Apostolic of the Midland District, who felt its moderate tone and its fair and generous conclusions were a sell-out to the Protestant government. The work of Lord Acton and the Downside Benedictines is assessed in good proportion, considering the limitations of space, but to this reviewer Philip Hughes deserved a great deal more than the five lines assigned to him

on p. 529 in view of the number and quality of the works with which he has enriched the history of the Church in England during these past thirty or more years. In the section on poetry Americans will find it odd to see Fr. John Banister Tabb listed as having published a volume of poems at the Bodley Head in 1896 (p. 538). The volume in question was published in December, 1894, by the press of John Lane in London and Fr. Tabb was then, as he had always been and always remained, a thorough American who, aside from a brief time during the Civil War, never resided in England. Likewise Mrs. Pearl Craigie (John Oliver Hobbes), the novelist, was an American by birth (p. 547).

In a work so large as this with so many authors it might be expected that one would encounter a good many printer's errors. But the proof readers have done their work well and the reviewer noticed only two such slips, viz., 'even' for 'eve' (p. 170) and 'seems' for 'seem' (p. 236). Another minor error occurs on p. 278 where 1866 is given as the date of Manning's accession to the Archdiocese of Westminster whereas it should have been 1865. There is an impressive body of factual data within the covers of this book and a great number of candid and arresting judgments and interpretations. As for the measure of the role that English Catholicism has played in the life of the nation during the last century, it is not possible for the historian to assess it with exactness. In closing a review of this volume in its issue of Nov. 17, 1950, the *Times Literary Supplement* quoted the warning of Manning that the priesthood should not remain one of the sacristy but should move out and exercise its influence upon the civil life of the nation. The reviewer stated that on the finding of a solution to the problem of how Catholics could best combine loyalty to their own creed with greater ease of approach to official bodies and other religious denominations might depend how much of the future of English Christianity will lie with the Church of Rome. It is certainly a problem of the deepest seriousness for English Catholics as well as for those of other countries. But as Bishop Beck says in his concluding essay, signs are not wanting that the reign of materialism is coming to an end and that religious dogmas are once more finding a sympathetic climate in many circles. If such a situation should develop Catholicism will offer men their only real hope of fulfilling their desires. In the providence of God the tremendous progress made by Catholicism in England during the last century, to which this volume bears splendid witness, may continue and offer to the coming generations a "third spring" that may find the Church of St. Augustine of Canterbury, of St. Thomas à Becket, and of St. Thomas More equal to the opportunity and the challenge which confront it.

JOHN TRACY ELLIS

KATHOLISCHE MARIENKUNDE. Edited by Paul Sträter, S.J. Vol. I: *Maria in der Offenbarung*, pp. 383; Vol. II: *Maria in der Glaubenswissenschaft*, pp. 359; Paderborn: Schöningh, 1947.

There is a tendency today to produce encyclopedic works on the Virgin Mother. The French will have Du Manoir's *Maria*, the Italians Cecchelli's *Mater Christi*, the Germans the present work. It will comprise three volumes. The first treats the sources of Mariology, the second gives a systematic treatment of the Marian doctrines, the third will deal with Marian doctrines in the spiritual life and in the apostolate. Each of the articles is written by a specialist.

The first volume, dealing with the sources, gives the historical development of Marian truths, beginning with the Scriptural picture of Mary and running through two thousand years of life in the Church. The first article, the picture of Mary in the Old Testament, is done by the eminent Scripture scholar and former rector of the Pontifical Biblical Institute at Rome, Fr. Bea, S.J. He presents it under four heads: Mary in prophetic vision, Mary in the eternal plan of God, Mary as the pure spouse of God, Mary as prefigured typically. The best section seems to be the third, where Fr. Bea shows that the bride of the Canticle and of Psalm 44 is also Mary. The explanation of Isaias 7: 14 is very good. The reviewer finds the interpretation of Gen. 3: 15 unsatisfactory. Rightly does Fr. Bea conclude his study by stating that the picture of Mary in the Old Testament is richer and more glorious than one might at first suspect.

The late Fr. Merk, S.J., well known for his work on the Greek text of the New Testament, presents the picture of Mary in the New Testament. This is an excellent, devotional life of Mary, concise and correct. For the sake of completeness a few sentences might have been added about the effect for mankind of Mary's consent. Fr. Merk makes keen observations, especially psychological, where the Scriptures lack explicit information.

Next we are treated to the picture of Mary in the Eastern Fathers, by Ignatius Ortiz de Urbino, S.J. In this summary of the matter, he stresses the importance of the patristic concept of Mary as the opposite of Eve, and the direct co-operation of Mary in the redemptive work. The reviewer cannot agree that St. Irenaeus imputed to Mary a moral imperfection (p. 94). The author uses a homily of Cyril of Alexandria and a letter of Nilus without noting that these are doubtful.

Hieronymus Engberding, O.S.B., shows us the portrait of Mary in the Eastern liturgies. It is very revealing to see how much these liturgies (e.g., the Coptic and Ethiopian) sang the praises of Mary, and how full they were of Mary's mediatory role, as well as of other Marian doctrines.

Hugo Rahner, S.J., unveils the picture of Mary in the Latin Fathers. This is an orderly, informative and up-to-date treatise. As the author proceeds he shows how untenable are the positions of Koch and Barth.

Philipp Oppenheim, O.S.B., known for his monumental work on the liturgy, writes on Mary in the Latin Liturgy. This is the longest article of the volume. It treats the subject rather thoroughly under five heads: an historical introduction, the modern cult of Mary in the liturgy, the sources of Marian liturgical texts, thoughts on individual feasts (by way of sample he comments on the Feasts of the Seven Dolors and of the Assumption), doctrinal content for Mariology. In this last section one might object to the author's speaking of Mary's redemption as a *Befreiung;* Mary was redeemed not by liberation but by preservation.

Marianus Müller, O.F.M., and Ernst Bömínghaus, S.J., treat of the Mother of God in the Middle Ages and in the post-Tridentine era respectively. Both articles are well done as far as they go. They could be more complete in the choice of theologians. The Franciscan author overlooks too many non-Franciscan theologians of the Middle Ages; the Jesuit author forgets that there were a good many outstanding Mariologists among the Franciscans in the modern era. It seems that a chronological treatment of the Middle Ages, as for the post-Tridentine times, would have been more satisfactory; or the topical divisions should have been more logical and coherent. It is to Fr. Müller's credit that, in true Franciscan fashion, he extols the place of Mary in the world plan; Mary is in reality Queen of *all* creation.

In the second volume, the close student of Scheeben, Carl Feckes, gives us an excellent study on Mary as the Virgin Mother of God. His method is cautious and Catholic. He always makes us aware of what the popes have said on the matter. After reading this article of some ninety pages one recalls with joy Our Lady's words: "Quia fecit mihi magna qui potens est."

The same author has a second article, also rather long, on the graces of Mary. He shows how all the graces given to Mary, from her Immaculate Conception till her glorious Assumption, have a well defined unity; they were all given her on account of her Son, and so that she might be most like to Him. Here again Fr. Feckes' impartial method of calling on all theologians to paint the picture of *die Begnadigte* deserves high praise.

Johann Beumer, S.J., traces the concept of Mary as the Mother of Christians in the writings of the Popes, in Sacred Scripture, in the writings of the Fathers and the Scholastics. He shows the relation of this doctrine to other Marian doctrines. The author rightly takes